Congressional Power over Office Creation by West, E. Garrett
166 
E .  G A R R E T T  W E S T
Congressional Power over Office Creation 
abstract. The Constitution leaves the creation of the institutions of government to ordinary
political processes. While intricate constitutionalized procedures govern the election of Congress, 
the President, and the Vice President, the Constitution anticipated but did not establish a host of 
other personnel and positions. Instead, it leaves the task of institution building to Congress. This 
Note argues that text, structure, and history demonstrate that the Constitution gives Congress 
exclusive authority over office creation. Textually, the Appointments Clause and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause together empower Congress alone to “establish[] by Law” federal offices. Structur-
ally, Congress has the democratic and technical capacity to organize the government. And Con-
gress’s power to “constitute” federal institutions mimics the original act of Constitution making: 
just as “We the People” could “ordain and establish this Constitution,” the Appointments Clause 
allows Congress to “establish[] by Law . . . all other Officers of the United States.” 
Congress’s exclusive office-creating power has surprising and important implications for a 
series of live constitutional controversies. In this Note, I discuss three issues regarding the balance 
of power between the President and Congress in structuring the administrative state. First, I eval-
uate the related problems of statutory qualifications clauses and for-cause removal provisions. Per-
haps counterintuitively, I conclude that qualifications clauses should almost never raise constitu-
tional issues, but for-cause removal provisions almost always should. The Constitution’s 
distinction between ex ante office creation and ex post presidential control justifies such differen-
tial treatment. And it explains why Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board was rightly decided, but also articulates a limiting principle on the President’s authority to
control the executive branch. Second, I discuss the constitutionality of temporary appointments. 
Drawing on Justice Thomas’s concurrence in NLRB v. SW General, Inc., I show that, in some cir-
cumstances, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 makes an unconstitutional “end-run around 
the Appointments Clause.” But my interpretation of the Clause still gives Congress broad discre-
tion to allow for temporary appointments. Third, this Note clarifies the employee/officer distinc-
tion in Appointments Clause jurisprudence. The Court’s decision in Lucia v. SEC presents a series
of puzzles for the employee/officer distinction that this Note attempts to resolve. Together, these 
three doctrinal issues illustrate how Congress’s exclusive office-creating power ought to inform 
the constitutional analysis in separation-of-powers cases. 
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introduction 
The Constitution of 1789 left the creation of the institutions of government 
to ordinary political processes. The document included an intricate set of proce-
dures that would allow Congress, the President, and the Vice President to take 
their positions in the new national government.
1
 Yet it anticipated, but did not 
establish, a host of other personnel and positions—including “Heads of Depart-
ments,” “Ambassadors,” “Judges of the supreme Court,” a “Chief Justice,” and 
“principal Officer[s].”
2
Between 1789 and 1791, the First Congress—often aware that its precedents 
would clarify and settle the Constitution’s meaning
3
—outlined many of the in-
stitutions that remain a part of the fabric of America’s constitutional order.
4
 By 
September of 1789, for instance, Congress had established the Department of 
Foreign Affairs, the Department of War, the Department of the Treasury, the 
Office of the Attorney General, and the federal judiciary.
5
 With these framework 
statutes, Congress asserted its vast power to create, alter, define, and limit the 
1. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (setting the procedures for the election of the House of Rep-
resentatives); id. art. I, § 3 (same for the Senate); id. art. II, § 1, cls. 2-4 (same for the President 
and Vice President).
2. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; id. art. II, § 2, cls. 1, 2.
3. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress, 1789-
1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 777 n.10 (1994) (referencing statements of James Madison and
George Washington); see also Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early
Versions and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 232 (1989) (arguing that early Congresses
and Presidents understood the precedential power of their communications). President
Washington was particularly keen to establish strong precedents. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 
28 (statement of President Washington) (enjoining the House and Senate to set aside “local
prejudices or attachments” so “that the foundations of our national policy will be laid in the
pure and immutable principles of private morality, and the pre-eminence of free Government 
be exemplified by all the attributes which can win the affections of its citizens, and command 
the respect of the world”); Letter from George Washington, President of the U.S., to John
Adams, Vice President of the U.S. (May 10, 1789), in 2 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: 
PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 246-47 (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1987) [hereinafter PAPERS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON] (“Many things which appear of little importance in themselves and at the be-
ginning, may have great and durable consequences from their having been established at the
commencement of a new general Government.” (brackets omitted)).
4. See Currie, supra note 3, at 777 (describing Congress’s task as one “partly of interpretation and
partly of interstitial creation, for the Framers had been too wise to attempt to regulate all the
details themselves”). See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE 
FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801 (1997) (detailing federal office creation at the Founding).
5. See Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 28 (Department of Foreign Affairs); Act of Aug. 7, 1789,
ch. 7, 1 Stat. 49 (Department of War); Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65 (Department of
Treasury); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (Attorney General and federal judiciary).
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scope and powers of federal institutions. Since then, Congress’s predominance 
as institution-builder-in-chief has remained a basic feature of the Constitution’s 
separation-of-powers framework.
6
Drawing on this theme of creation and construction, this Note explores Con-
gress’s role in the creation of executive-branch offices. In particular, I ask what is 
meant by the Constitution’s mandate that “all other Officers of the United States, 
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, . . . shall be estab-
lished by Law.”
7
 One could imagine limitless other approaches to this allocation
of responsibility. For example, the Constitution could have created more Article 
II offices besides those of the President and Vice President, listing, for instance, 
the Departments of War, Treasury, or State
8
—and maybe going so far as to allow 
the electoral college to select them directly.
9
By contrast, the Founders also could have taken their cue from the British, 
vesting the authority both to create offices and to appoint officers in the execu-
tive. Indeed, the Constitution pursues this approach elsewhere, as it collapses 
the office-creation and officer-appointment powers for “Ambassadors,” “Con-
suls,” and “other public Ministers.”
10
 Tacking in another direction, the Founders 
6. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 110 (2005) (“In truth, the real 
sweep of section 8’s final clause extended not downward over states but sideways against other 
branches of the federal government.”); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Congress as Elephant,
104 VA. L. REV. 797, 826-31 (2018); William W. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determin-
ing Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect 
of the Sweeping Clause, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 102, 107 (1976) (arguing that Congress
alone has the responsibility to determine by law what additional authority, if any, the executive 
and courts are to have). 
7. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
8. The Framers considered provisions that would create offices in the Constitution itself. See,
e.g., 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 342-44 (M. Farrand ed., 1937) (Aug. 
20) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS] (recording a motion by Governor Morris to establish
a “Secretary of Domestic Affairs,” “Secretary of Commerce and Finance,” “Secretary of foreign 
affairs,” “Secretary of War,” and “Secretary of the Marine”). 
9. But cf. Theodore Y. Blumoff, Separation of Powers and the Origins of the Appointments Clause, 37
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1037, 1073 (1987) (“Consistent with Madison, Hamilton dismissed as inef-
ficient and ‘impracticable’ popular election of the judiciary.”). 
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see Caleb Cushing, Ambassadors and Other Public Ministers of the United 
States, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 186, 193 (1855) (“In a word, the power to appoint diplomatic agents,
and to select for employment any one out of the varieties of the class, according to his judg-
ment of the public service, is a constitutional function of the President, not derived from, nor 
limitable by, Congress, but requiring only the ultimate concurrence of the Senate; and so it
was understood in the early practice of the Government.”). But see Saikrishna B. Prakash &
Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 309 n.336 (2001) 
(questioning “whether the Constitution permits the President to appoint to a diplomatic post 
in the absence of a statute first creating the diplomatic post”).
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could have followed New York’s model by vesting office creation and officer ap-
pointment in a Council of Appointment.
11
 Or finally, the Founders might have 
followed the model of the Articles of Confederation by vesting these powers en-
tirely in Congress.
12
Although these alternatives may seem fanciful possibilities today, their prev-
alence at the Founding offers an opportunity to reflect on the Constitution’s con-
scious allocation of responsibility: Congress creates and defines offices “by Law,”
and the President “nominates” and “appoints” the officers that will fill those of-
fices (usually subject to the Senate’s approval).
13
 Textually, the Appointments 
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause together give Congress exclusive 
power over office creation. What’s more, this interpretation accords with Con-
gress’s position as the first among equals and with the Constitution’s origins in 
an act of popular sovereignty. Congress’s power to “constitute” governmental 
institutions mimics the act of Constitution making: just as “We the Peo-
ple . . . ordain[ed] and establish[ed] this Constitution,” the Appointments Clause
allows Congress to “establish[] by Law” “all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for.”
14
Congress’s exclusive office-creating power has surprising and important im-
plications for a host of live constitutional controversies. This Note addresses 
three such issues. First, a perennial debate in separation-of-powers scholarship
concerns the President’s power to remove executive-branch officials—or, 
phrased differently, the limit on Congress’s power to insulate those officials from 
presidential control. Most recently, this debate arose during the now-concluded 
litigation over the constitutionality of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
11. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 433 (2d ed.
1998) (describing the New York plan).
12. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, paras. 4-5 (“The United States in Congress
assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive right and power of . . . appointing all officers 
of the land forces, in the service of the United States, excepting regimental officers[;] appoint-
ing all the officers of the naval forces, and commissioning all officers whatever in the service
of the United States[;] . . . and [appointing] such other committees and civil officers as may
be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States . . . .”).
13. Although the Constitution uses the word “Officers” instead of “Offices,” the Appointments
Clause makes much more sense if one understands it to refer to offices. Chief Justice Marshall 
agreed: “I feel no diminution of reverence for the framers of this sacred instrument, when I
say that some ambiguity of expression has found its way into this clause. If the relative ‘which,’ 
refers to the word ‘appointments,’ that word is referred to in a sense rather different from that 
in which it had been used. It is used to signify the act of placing a man in office, and referred
to as signifying the office itself. Considering this relative as referring to the word ‘offices,’ which
word, if not expressed, must be understood [to be implied] . . . .” United States v. Maurice, 26 F.
Cas. 1211, 1213 (C.C.D. Va. 1823) (No. 15,747) (emphasis added). 
14. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).




 Yet the framing of the constitutional question in the CFPB litiga-
tion—whether the CFPB’s structure “attenuate[s] presidential control over core 
executive functions”
16
—invites a problematic functional analysis. Scholars have 
noted, for instance, that for-cause removal provisions are just one way to insulate 
agencies from presidential control.
17
 But if the Constitution forbids Congress 
from weakening the President’s hold, then the Court will have to scrutinize a 
whole host of now-permissible administrative structures.
18
 What should the 
Court do, for instance, about technical or professional qualifications, partisan-
balance requirements, interagency consultation procedures, and other substan-
tive statutes that structurally limit the President’s control over law execution?
19
This Note’s analysis of Congress’s office-establishing power offers a sensible 
bright-line rule rooted in the text and structure of the Constitution.
20
 Put simply, 
15. In PHH Corp. v. CFPB, the D.C. Circuit sitting en banc upheld the constitutionality of a “sin-
gle Director protected against removal by the President without cause.” PHH Corp. v. CFPB,
881 F.3d 75, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc). Although PHH declined to petition for certiorari,
see Yuka Hayashi, PHH Decides Not to Appeal CFPB Case to Supreme Court, WALL ST. J. (May 
3, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/phh-decides-not-to-appeal-cfpb-case-to-supreme
-court-1525369924 [https://perma.cc/TU6N-9YBV], the reasoning of the dissenting opinion 
could well be adopted by the Court in later iterations of the same challenge, see, e.g., Jonathan 
H. Adler, En Banc D.C. Circuit Upholds Constitutionality of CFPB, REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIR-
ACY (Jan. 31, 2018, 11:03 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/01/31/en-banc-dc-circuit 
-upholds-constitutiona [https://perma.cc/3ZEG-9MED]; Barbara S. Mishkin, Fifth Circuit 
Agrees to Hear Challenge to CFPB’s Constitutionality, CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (Apr. 26, 2018), 
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2018/04/26/fifth-circuit-agrees-to-hear 
-challenge-to-cfpbs-constitutionality [https://perma.cc/BFT9-L2Q2].
16. PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 80.
17. For a sampling of the literature, see Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture
Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B.
Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599 (2010); Kirti Datla &
Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL
L. REV. 769 (2013); Brian D. Feinstein, Designing Executive Agencies for Congressional Influence,
69 ADMIN. L. REV. 259 (2017); Brian D. Feinstein & Daniel J. Hemel, Partisan Balance with 
Bite, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 9 (2018); and Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163 (2013). 
18. But see Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 523 (2010)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Compared to Congress and the President, the Judiciary possesses an 
inferior understanding of the realities of administration, and the manner in which power, in-
cluding and most especially political power, operates in context.”).
19. See generally infra notes 217-219 (citing literature on agency independence); Matthew A. Sam-
berg, Note, “Established by Law”: Saving Statutory Limitations on Presidential Appointments from 
Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1735 (2010) (canvassing the literature on the constitu-
tionality of qualifications).
20. See infra Section II.A.
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the Constitution disaggregates the power to create offices from the power to ap-
point and control them, vesting the former with Congress and the latter with the 
President. Because of this distinction, I shall argue, ex ante limitations on the 
President’s appointment power (i.e., qualifications clauses, partisan balance re-
quirements, and so on) satisfy the structural constitutional requirements, while 
ex post or ongoing limitations on the President’s control of his subordinates (i.e., 
for-cause removal requirements) are unconstitutional. 
Second, I discuss an undertheorized (though practically important) bureau-
cratic practice: ensuring administrative continuity through acting officials or 
temporary appointees.
21
 Once again, a CFPB-related controversy has raised this 
issue in the public’s attention. Richard Cordray’s resignation as Director led to a 
flurry of controversy and litigation over who was his legitimate successor.
22
 Pur-
suant to the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (FVRA), President Trump 
appointed Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director Mick Mulvaney 
to serve as acting Director.
23
 Cordray’s Deputy Director, Leandra English, sued 
President Trump, arguing that she had become acting Director “by operation of 
the Dodd-Frank Act.”
24
 The district court denied English’s request for a prelim-




Lurking beneath the statutory dispute is a constitutional one: how can these 
sorts of vacancies acts be squared with the text of the Appointments Clause? Af-
ter all, the Director of the CFPB is a principal officer who must be appointed 
with the advice and consent of the Senate.
26
 In this case, then, the CFPB contro-
 
21. See generally Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 
S. CAL. L. REV. 913 (2009) (examining vacancies in executive agencies from President Carter 
to President George W. Bush). 
22. See Yuka Hayashi, CFPB Head Cordray to Step Down, Paving Way for Change at Watchdog, WALL 
ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2017, 2:35 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cfpb-director-richard-cordray 
-to-step-down-1510766617 [https://perma.cc/8KGM-Q577]. 
23. See English v. Trump, 279 F. Supp. 3d 307, 311 (D.D.C. 2018). 
24. Id. 
25. See Emily Flitter, Consumer Bureau Official Who Sued Trump to Step Down and Drop Her Suit, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/06/business/cfpb-leandra 
-english.html [https://perma.cc/2A75-JAUE]; see also Lalita Clozel, Appeals Court Skeptical of 
Mulvaney’s Ability to Independently Lead CFPB, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 12, 2018, 1:06 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/appeals-court-skeptical-of-mulvaneys-ability-to 
-independently-lead-cfpb-1523552808 [https://perma.cc/Q65B-S5PV] (discussing oral argu-
ment in English’s since-terminated appeal to the D.C. Circuit). 
26. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Hen-
derson, J., dissenting) (“As no one disputes, the Director is a principal officer.”). 
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versy casts doubt on both the Dodd-Frank Act’s automatic-promotion provi-
sion
27
 (which English claimed automatically promoted her to acting Director) 
and the FVRA’s temporary-appointment provisions
28
 (which President Trump 
used to elevate Mulvaney). Worse, the Constitution’s Recess Appointments 
Clause provides a constitutional mechanism for filling up vacancies which the 
FVRA seems to have circumvented. Therefore, in a concurring opinion in NLRB 
v. SW General, Inc. last term, Justice Thomas argued that the FVRA makes an 
impermissible “end-run around the Appointments Clause.”
29
 
But this Note’s emphasis on Congress’s office-establishing authority can re-
solve this apparent constitutional problem. In particular, I articulate two mutu-
ally reinforcing theories of the Appointments Clause that justify statutorily au-
thorized vacancies acts.
30
 First, because acting officers perform only “special and 
temporary” duties, they might be inferior officers under the Appointments 
Clause. If so, Congress “may by Law vest the[ir] Appointment . . . in the Presi-
dent alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”
31
 Second, 
because Congress’s office-creating authority allows it to specify what I will call 
contingent duties (i.e., duties that become actual only upon the satisfaction of 
some condition precedent), the Constitution also generally allows automatic-
promotion provisions like the one in the Dodd-Frank Act. Put differently, Con-
gress can condition an officer’s duties on the vacancy of another office. 
Generally, careful application of one or both of these theories should justify 
a particular vacancies act. But I also attempt to articulate a limiting principle. 
Congress cannot pass statutes that allow acting officers to indefinitely perform 
the functions of principal officers without Senate approval. The ongoing contro-
versy surrounding the CFPB raises just this issue. Critics of President Trump’s 
next appointee, for instance, “accused the administration of making a place-
holder nomination to keep Mick Mulvaney . . . in power longer.”
32
 Following 
Justice Thomas, I suggest that the prolonged tenure of temporary appointees 
can be constitutionally impermissible. 
 
27. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(5)(B) (2018). 
28. 5 U.S.C. § 3345 (2018). 
29. 137 S. Ct. 929, 949 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
30. See infra Section II.B.2. 
31. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
32. Lalita Clozel, Kathy Kraninger to Be Nominated to Head Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
WALL ST. J. (June 16, 2018, 8:18 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/kathy-kraninger-to-be 
-nominated-to-head-cfpb-1529183308 [https://perma.cc/5SR6-4SB4]. 
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Third, this Note’s analysis offers more guidance on the employee/officer dis-
tinction in Appointments Clause jurisprudence.
33
  The distinction remains 
murky after the Court in Lucia v. SEC determined that the Security and Exchange 
Commission’s administrative law judges (ALJs) were “inferior officers” under 
Article II, but declined to “elaborate on Buckley’s ‘significant authority’ test.”
34
 
Nevertheless, Justice Kagan’s majority, Justice Thomas’s concurrence, and Jus-
tice Sotomayor’s dissent each offer a competing articulation of the distinction. 
Relying entirely on Freytag v. Commissioner,
35 
the majority reasoned that the ALJ 
exercised “‘significant discretion’ when carrying out [its] ‘important func-
tions’”—like “ensur[ing] fair and orderly adversarial hearings.”
36
  Justice 
Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, would define “Officers of the United States” 
to include “all federal officials with ongoing statutory duties.”
37
  Justice So-
tomayor would gloss the “significant authority” test to require “the ability to 
make final, binding decisions on behalf of the Government.”
38
 None of the opin-
ions, however, engages with Chief Justice Marshall’s cogent discussion of the 
Appointments Clause in United States v. Maurice.
39
 This Note attempts to offer 
the “more detailed legal criteria” that the Court in Lucia declined to provide.
40
 In 
particular, I highlight—and try to resolve—some of the puzzles raised by Lucia. 
The argument proceeds in two Parts. In Part I, I elaborate the textual, struc-
tural, and historical arguments that demonstrate congressional supremacy in of-
fice creation. In Section I.A, I argue that the Constitution reflects a conscious 
attempt to tack between the competing extremes of (1) the British Constitution 
 
33. For some recent attempts to deal with this question, see Aditya Bamzai, The Attorney General 
and Early Appointments Clause Practice, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1501 (2018); Jennifer L. Mas-
cott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443 (2018); and E. Garrett West, 
Clarifying the Employee-Officer Distinction in Appointments Clause Jurisprudence, 127 YALE L.J.F. 
42 (2017). 
34. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018). For the symposium on Lucia hosted by the Yale 
Journal on Regulation, see Symposium on Lucia v. SEC, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT 
(2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/category/symposia/symposium-on-lucia-v-sec [https://
perma.cc/9X8N-8WKP]. 
35. 501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
36. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053 (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 878); see id. (“Freytag says everything 
necessary to decide this case.”). 
37. Id. at 2057 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
38. Id. at 2065 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
39. See United States v. Maurice, 26 F. Cas. 1211, 1214 (C.C.D. Va. 1823) (No. 15,747); see also Gar-
rett West, Chief Justice Marshall and the Appointments Clause, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COM-
MENT (Apr. 6, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/chief-justice-marshall-and-the-appointments 
-clause-by-garrett-west [https://perma.cc/HK32-LXNF] (discussing Maurice); West, supra 
note 33, at 46-48 (same). 
40. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2052. 
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and (2) the Revolutionary state constitutions and the Articles of Confederation. 
The Constitution’s institutional middle road distinguishes the power to create 
offices from the power to fill them, vesting Congress with exclusive office-creat-
ing authority. In addition to a plain-text reading, this Section explores the draft-
ing history of the Appointments Clause as well as an early circuit court opinion 
by Chief Justice Marshall to confirm this reading. In Section I.B, I show that 
early constitutional practice likewise supports this interpretation. President 
Washington and the First Congress (generally) respected the careful institu-
tional balance that the Constitution set in place. In Section I.C, I double back to 
preconstitutional history to show that my interpretation of the Appointments 
Clause makes good sense in light of the Framers’ experience under British rule 
and early state constitutions. In Section I.D, I briefly explain a few exceptions to 
my interpretation of the Clause. In sum, Part I argues that the Framers con-
sciously vested Congress with exclusive office-creating authority. 
Part II explains why this argument from text and structure matters. In Sec-
tion II.A, I discuss the related problems of statutory qualifications clauses and 
for-cause removal provisions. Relying on the distinction between ex ante office 
creation and ex post presidential control, I argue that qualifications clauses 
should almost never raise constitutional problems, but for-cause removal provi-
sions almost always should. In Section II.B, I discuss the constitutionality of 
temporary appointments. Drawing on Justice Thomas’s recent concurrence in 
NLRB v. SW General, Inc.,
41
 I show that the FVRA sometimes (but only some-
times) makes an unconstitutional “end-run around the Appointments Clause.”
42
 
In Section II.C, I argue that this Note also helps clarify the employee/officer dis-
tinction in Appointments Clause jurisprudence and elaborate on the reasoning 
in Lucia v. SEC. 
i .  congress and the appointments clause 
This Part argues that the Constitution strikes a careful institutional balance 
that gives Congress exclusive authority over office creation but gives the Presi-
dent the power to appoint and control those officers. This institutional balance 
finds support in the Constitution’s text and structure, conforms to early practice 
under President Washington and the First Congress, and improves on the 
Founders’ unsatisfactory experience under the British and early state constitu-
tions. 
 
41. 137 S. Ct. 929, 945 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
42. Id. at 949. 
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A. Text and Structure 
Read with care, the Constitution’s text strikes a subtle institutional balance 
between Congress’s authority to create offices and the President’s power to ap-
point (and control) officers.
43
 Before the President may select and appoint some-
one to assist with the execution of the laws, he or she must rely on general au-
thorizing statutes that vest him or her with the authority to appoint. Put another 
way, the officer holds an office that must be “established by Law.” 
First, the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Appointments Clause must 
be read together to show that Congress has the exclusive authority to create ex-
ecutive-branch civil offices.
44
 Most generally, the Necessary and Proper Clause 
gives sweeping authority to Congress to structure the other branches of the fed-
eral government—what some have called its horizontal effect.
45
  Under this 
Clause, Congress enjoys the power to “carr[y] into Execution” not only the 
“foregoing Powers” (that is, its own Article I, Section 8 powers), but also “all 
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”
46
 Because the text of this grant 
of congressional power references the Vesting Clauses of Article II and Article 
III, it allows Congress to pass laws augmenting and channeling the powers of 
the executive and judicial branches.
47
 Rightly understood, the Clause reinforces 
 
43. This distinction between officers and offices has long been well recognized. See, e.g., Edward 
Bates, Plurality of Offices, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 446, 447-48 (1863) (arguing that nothing prevents 
one person from holding multiple offices); Caleb Cushing, Duplicate Offices, 8 Op. Att’y Gen. 
325, 325-26 (1857) (stating that he is “not aware” of any provision that “forbids the holding of 
two distinct offices or appointments by the same person”); see also Limitations on Presidential 
Power to Create a New Executive Branch Entity to Receive and Administer Funds Under Foreign Aid 
Legislation, 9 Op. O.L.C. 76, 77-78 (1985) [hereinafter Limitations on Presidential Power]; supra 
note 13 (discussing Chief Justice Marshall’s view of this distinction). 
44. The Office of Legal Counsel claims that there might be a residual set of cases in which the 
President may create an office. See Limitations on Presidential Power, supra note 43, at 78 n.1 
(“There may be cases, however—in a national emergency, for example—in which we would 
conclude that the President may, in effect, create an office in order to carry out constitutional 
responsibilities that otherwise could not be fulfilled.”). This Note takes no stance on whether 
the President has emergency powers that would alter the normal constitutional scheme. Cf. 
Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11 (1993) (ar-
guing that the President possesses a general power to “protect and defend the personnel, 
property, and instrumentalities of the United States from harm” but no emergency powers). 
45. AMAR, supra note 6, at 110-12. 
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
47. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States” (emphasis added)); id. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be 
vested . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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the structural principle that Congress should be first among equals in the con-
struction and definition of the federal government.
48
 
Still, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not alone carry the argument that 
Congress should have exclusive control over office creation. If the Article II Vest-
ing Clause is read to include the authority to create offices, then reliance on the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to establish Congress’s exclusive control over office 
creation would seem question begging. The Necessary and Proper Clause vests 
a dependent power by requiring legislation to be “proper for carrying into Exe-
cution . . . other Powers.”
49
 Thus, this power must be defined by and tailored to 
the exercise of powers granted elsewhere.
50
 If the grant of “executive power” is 
interpreted to include office creation, then Congress’s horizontal power would 
be to assist the President with his or her power to create offices. 
This reading of the Article II Vesting Clause would surely preclude exclusive 
congressional authority. The objection proceeds as follows: looking to historical 
practice, the British Constitution gave the King the “sole power of creat-
ing . . . offices.”
51
 Thus, one could argue that the Article II Vesting Clause vests 
this traditional notion of “executive power” in the President.
52
 Consider by anal-
ogy the Constitution’s treatment of lower federal courts. Because the “English 
 
48. See Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 116-17; see also John F. Manning, The Supreme Court 2013 
Term—Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 78-84 (2014) (arguing 
that the Necessary and Proper Clause enshrines a rule of Thayerian deference to Congress’s 
decisions about how to structure the administrative state). 
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
50. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional 
Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 274-75 (1993) (discussing the Sweeping 
Clause as “tied to the exercise of some other identifiable constitutional power of the national 
government”); cf. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1867, 1880-1912 (2005) (arguing that the exercise of power under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause is limited by the scope of the substantive power it seeks to “carry[] into Execution”). 
51. See 1 ALPHEUS TODD, ON PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND: ITS ORIGIN, DEVELOP-
MENT, AND PRACTICAL OPERATION 165 (London, Sampson, Low, Marston & Co. 1892) (“The 
crown, besides being the fountain of dignity and honours, is likewise entrusted by the consti-
tution with the sole power of creating such offices . . . .”); see also THE DECLARATION OF INDE-
PENDENCE (U.S. 1776) (“He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms 
of Officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance.”); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES *261-62 (“For the same reason therefore that honours are in the disposal of the 
king, offices ought to be so likewise; and as the king may create new titles, so may he create 
new offices.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 421 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) (“[The King] not only appoints to all offices, but can create offices.”). 
52. See, e.g., Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 10, at 234 (“As we seek to establish in this Article, the 
ordinary eighteenth-century meaning of executive power—as reflected, for example, in the 
works of leading political writers known to the constitutional generation, such as Locke, Mon-
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Crown had historically created courts by royal prerogative,”
53
 Article 1, Section 8 
specifically invests Congress with the power to “constitute Tribunals inferior to 
the supreme Court.”
54
 With respect to courts, then, the Framers seemed to think 
that the horizontal Necessary and Proper Clause did not itself mark the depar-
ture from the British constitutional baseline. The objection can be stated simply: 
if the Framers thought that the Inferior Tribunals Clause was necessary to depart 
from the British practice regarding court creation, then perhaps the Necessary 
and Proper Clause is also insufficient to break from the British practice regarding 
office creation. Therefore, the objection goes, the Article II Vesting Clause gives 
the President the authority to create offices. 
But this objection misses the critical point that the text of the Appointments 
Clause itself suggests Congress’s exclusive prerogative of office creation. The 
Clause describes the mechanism by which the President may appoint officers, 
but its text also draws out a background principle of constitutional structure: 
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent 
of the Senate, shall appoint . . . all other Officers of the United States, 
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which 
shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appoint-
ment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President 
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
55
 
Best read, this Clause shows that Congress enjoys exclusive power to create 
offices.
56
 The language admits of no exceptions. All offices, besides those estab-
lished elsewhere in the Constitution (e.g., the Presidency
57
) and mentioned ear-
lier in the Appointments Clause (e.g., ambassadors), shall be established by law. 
 
tesquieu, and Blackstone—included foreign affairs powers.”). But see generally Curtis A. Brad-
ley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 
545 (2004) (challenging what the authors call the “Vesting Clause Thesis,” which they attrib-
ute to Prakash & Ramsey, supra). 
53. AMAR, supra note 6, at 111. 
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; see also id. art. III, § 1, cl. 1 (vesting the “judicial Power” in “such 
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish”). 
55. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
56. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 187 n.2 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (“Indeed, the 
Framers added language to both halves of the Appointments Clause specifically to address the 
concern that the President might attempt unilaterally to create and fill federal offices.”). 
57. The Presidency is an “office.” See, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Why the Incompatibility 
Clause Applies to the Office of the President, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 143 (2009). For a 
discussion of the various uses of “officer” in the Constitution, see Seth Barrett Tillman, 
Originalism & the Scope of the Constitution’s Disqualification Clause, 33 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 59 
(2014); and William Baude, Constitutional Officers: A Very Close Reading, JOTWELL (July 28, 
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Within the Constitution’s text, “shall” imposes an obligation, while “may” intro-
duces discretion.
58
 Notably, the Inferior Officers Appointments Clause contrasts 
directly with the obligation imposed in the first half of Article II, Section 2: Con-
gress “may” vest appointment power in inferior officers, but it “shall” establish 
all offices. Of course, the Clause does not quite say that “Congress shall,” but the 
phrase clearly contemplates congressional legislation. Under the Constitution, 
only Congress exercises legislative power, and the Constitution’s uses of “by 
Law” consistently assume Congress as the subject of the command.
59
 
What’s more, those two words (“by Law”) subtly specify the President’s nar-
row role in the creation of offices. By adverting to law, the Constitution triggers 
the requirements of Article I, Section 7 processes.
60
 Because statutes must be pre-
sented to the President for his or her signature, the President has a say in the 
statutory structure. But this authority is confined to his or her participation in 
the lawmaking process. Thus, the Appointments Clause specifies that the Presi-
dent retains a role in office creation, but only in his or her capacity as a participant 
in congressional lawmaking. 
Besides the Appointments Clause’s uses of “shall” and “by Law,” the selection 
of “establish” carries deeper significance, tying the Clause to the Constitution’s 
democratic origins. The text echoes the Constitution’s bookends—the Preamble 
(“We the People . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution”) and Article VII 
 
2016), https://conlaw.jotwell.com/constitutional-officers-a-very-close-reading [https://
perma.cc/E7T5-2E8P], which reviews Seth Barrett Tillman, Who Can Be President of the United 
States?: Candidate Hillary Clinton and the Problem of Statutory Qualifications, 5 BRIT. J. AM. LE-
GAL STUD. 95 (2016). 
58. See Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the 
Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 782-86 n.147 (1984) (cataloging in 
detail the uses of “shall” and “may” in the Constitution’s text); see also, e.g., AMAR, supra note 
6, at 116 & n.16 (citing Clinton, supra, and applying this canon of interpretation to Article III). 
59. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“as they [Congress] shall by Law direct” (emphasis 
added)); id. art. § 4, cl. 1 (“the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regula-
tions” (emphasis added)); id. art. § 4, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall assemble . . . on the first 
Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.” (emphasis added)); 
id. art. § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Ap-
propriations made by Law.” (emphasis added)); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“the Congress may by 
Law provide for . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“ . . . Congress may by Law 
have directed.” (emphasis added)). 
60. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Represent-
atives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law be presented to the President of the United 
States”); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (discussing the requirements of bicameralism 
and presentment); AMAR, supra note 6, at 181-85 (discussing the President’s role in the law-
making process). 
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(“establishment of this Constitution”).
61
 With this repetition, the Appointments 
Clause hints that Congress should continue the Framers’ work of constituting a 
working government. Just as “We the People . . . establish[ed] this Constitution,” 
the Appointments Clause requires that Congress—the people’s representatives—
“establish[] by Law” “all other Officers of the United States.” 
More broadly, this qualified congressional supremacy makes good sense as a 
matter of political theory. During the 1780s, “American legal theorists . . . con-
ceptually relocated sovereignty from Parliament to the people themselves.”
62
 The 
Constitution subsequently enacted this abstract theory of popular sovereignty, 
first with ink on parchment, then with the votes of the American people.
63
 After 
this extraordinary act of ratification, though, the government would have to con-
tinue to draw its legitimacy from We the People during periods of normal poli-
tics.
64
 While the Preamble’s bold language (“We the People . . . do ordain and 
establish this Constitution”) declared the People’s sovereignty, the Constitution 
elaborated a set of institutions that would persist beyond the extraordinary act 
of ratification
65
—that is, “during periods of normal politics,” when “there can be 
no hope of capturing the living reality of popular sovereignty.”
66
 
Of course, during ordinary political moments, both the President and the 
judiciary can also claim to be We the People’s agents.
67
 But Congress still remains 
 
61. See U.S. CONST. pmbl.; id. art. VII; AMAR, supra note 6, at 29 (discussing the close textual link 
between the Preamble and Article VII). 
62. AMAR, supra note 6, at 106. 
63. See id.; see also, e.g., Remarks of James Wilson in the Pennsylvania Convention to Ratify the 
Constitution of the United States (Nov. 26, 1787), in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 
178, 213-14 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007) (“I mentioned, that Blackstone will 
tell you, that in Britain, [sovereignty] is lodged in the British Parliament . . . . [But] the truth 
is, that the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable authority remains with the people. I men-
tioned, also, that the practical recognition of this truth was reserved for the honor of this 
country. I recollect no constitution founded on this principle; but we have witnessed the im-
provement, and enjoy the happiness of seeing it carried into practice.”). 
64. See 1 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 173-190 (1993) (describing and 
confronting this problem and offering constitutional “dualism” as an answer); cf. Edward S. 
Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 
153 (1928) (discussing the origins of the American idea of the Constitution as “superior to the 
will of human governors”). For the second part of Corwin’s Article, see Edward S. Corwin, 
The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 365 (1929). 
65. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[Y]ou 
are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America.”) (em-
phasis omitted). 
66. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1028 
(1984) (emphasis omitted). 
67. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1443 (1987). 
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the closest analogue to, and representative of, We the People.
68
 Within the Con-
stitution’s text, Article I bridges the gap between abstract notions of sovereignty 
and institutional reality; schematically, it follows the Preamble but precedes the 
Articles defining the executive and judicial powers.
69
 And the members of the 
House were to be “chosen by the People of the several States,” so that they would 
most directly represent the people themselves.
70
 Given the House’s democratic 
bona fides, cutting it out of the loop of office creation would run contrary to the 
Constitution’s broader democratic ethos. Just as We the People established the 
Constitution’s framework for politics, our representatives in Congress should 
craft the institutions of day-to-day governance. Therefore, the Constitution’s or-
dainment as an act of popular sovereignty supports the textual argument that 
Congress should have exclusive office-creating authority.
71
 
Now we can double back to dispense with the objection presented above—
that the Necessary and Proper Clause does not require that Congress have exclu-
sive control over the office-creation function.
72
 In brief, the Constitution departs 
from the British constitutional baseline by affirming that Congress shall “estab-
lish[] by Law” “all other Officers of the United States.”
73
 Because the Appoint-
ments Clause vests this authority in the federal government’s exclusive lawmak-
ing body (Congress), it withholds the office-creation function from the domain 
 
68. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I; AMAR, supra note 6, at 190 (referring to the House of Represent-
atives as “the people’s house”). 
69. See Amar, supra note 67, at 1443 n.71. 
70. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (mandating election for the House by the “people of the 
several States” and making the voting qualifications “requisite for Electors of the most nu-
merous Branch of the State Legislature”), with id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (mandating that the Senate 
be chosen by the state’s legislature), and id. art. II, § 1 (providing for the election of the Pres-
ident through the electoral college). For more on the connection between the House and the 
people, see AMAR, supra note 6, at 78-81 (discussing the debate over the size of the House and 
the importance for Madison and his allies of “strong bonds of sympathy and confidence link-
ing legislators and constituents”); and 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 8, at 416 (statement 
of James Wilson) (“Every man will possess a double Character, that of Citizen of the US. & 
[that] of a Citizen of an individ[ual] State—The National Legis. will apply to [the] former 
Charact[e]r—it ought then to be elected or appointed by the Citizens of the US, not the Leg-
islatures of the Indiv[idual] States . . . .”). 
71. For discussions that suggest some possible implications of this argument for the structure of 
the administrative state, see generally Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: 
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 598-99, 601 (1984); and 
Cass R. Sunstein & Lawrence Lessig, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
1 (1994). 
72. See supra text accompanying notes 49-54. 
73. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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of law execution (the President). Because the President’s constitutional author-
ity, then, is defined to exclude the office-creation power, the Necessary and 
Proper Clause allows Congress—and only Congress—to write laws that create 
offices that assist the President with “carrying into execution” the “executive 
Power.”
74
 Just as the Inferior Tribunals Clause marks the departure from the 
English Constitution for judicial appointees, the Appointments Clause marks 
the departure for executive branch offices. Read with care, the Constitution’s text 
vests in Congress the exclusive power of office creation. 
1. Drafting History 
The records from the Convention confirm this reading of the Appointments 
Clause.
75
 When the Committee of Detail returned with its draft, the proto-Ap-
pointments Clause read: “[the President] shall commission all the officers of the 
United States; and shall appoint officers in all cases not otherwise provided for 
by this Constitution.”
76
 Unlike the final Appointments Clause, this draft lan-
guage omits the “established by Law” requirement or any other reference to leg-
islation in the process of office creation. Noticing this absence in both the proto-
Appointments Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause,
77
 James Madison 
sought to clarify Congress’s role. Along with Charles Pinckney from South Car-
olina, he suggested that the Necessary and Proper Clause be altered to give Con-
gress power to “establish all offices,” claiming that it was “liable to cavil” that the 
power to make “all laws necessary and proper” did not already include it.
78
 
James Wilson, Gouverneur Morris, and others “urged that [it] could not be 
necessary,” and this amendment was rejected.
79
 But supporters of Madison’s 
view were not dissuaded. On August 24th, 1787, 
 
 
74. See id. art. I, § 8; id. art. II, § 1. 
75. See Blumoff, supra note 9, at 1061-70 (discussing the legislative history of the Clause). 
76. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 8, at 185 (Aug. 6). This phrasing matched what the 
whole Convention sent to the Committee of Detail. On July 23, the Convention agreed: “Re-
solved, That a national Executive be instituted . . . with Power to carry into Execution the na-
tional Laws [and] to appoint to Offices in Cases not otherwise provided for.” Id. at 132 (July 
23) (resolutions for the Committee of Detail). 
77. The Committee of Detail presented the Necessary and Proper Clause in its final form (except 
for a few minor changes in punctuation and capitalization). See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra 
note 8, at 182 (Aug. 6). 
78. Id. at 344-45 (Aug. 20). 
79. Id. at 345. 
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Mr. Sherman objected to the sentence “and shall appoint officers in 
all cases not otherwise provided for by this Constitution”. He admit-
ted it to be proper that many officers in the Executive Department 
should be so appointed—but contended that many ought not, as gen-
eral officers in the army in time of peace &c. Herein lay the corruption 




Building on Sherman’s suggestion, Madison argued that “‘officers’ [be 
struck] out and ‘to offices’ inserted, in order to obviate doubts that he might 
appoint officers without a previous creation of the offices by the Legislature.”
81
 
Yet again, this particular motion failed, but Dickinson finally won the Conven-
tion’s approval with the following: “[The President] shall appoint to all offices 
[reflecting Madison’s suggestion] established by this Constitution, except in 
cases herein otherwise provided for, and to all offices which may hereafter be created 
by law.”
82
 Despite the support of the Convention, this victory for Madison and 
his supporters would prove short lived. When the Committee of Eleven reported 
back on September 4th with a new draft, the text as amended again dropped the 
requirement that offices be created by law.
83
 The Convention twice considered 
the language without amending it,
84
 and the Committee of Style’s draft was sub-
stantially similar to the Committee of Eleven’s.
85
 
Nevertheless, the substance of Madison’s amendment was adopted during 
the final review of the Committee of Style’s draft. During this last-minute dis-
cussion, the Convention adopted two final amendments to the Appointments 
Clause. First, it accepted that “Congress may by law vest the appointments of 
such inferior officers as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts 
 
80. Id. at 405 (Aug. 24) (emphasis added). 
81. Id. 
82. Id. (emphasis added). 
83. Id. at 498-99 (Sept. 4) (“The President . . . shall nominate and by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate shall appoint . . . all other Officers of the U[nited] S[tates], whose ap-
pointments are not otherwise herein provided for.”). 
84. Id. at 538-39 (Sept. 7); id. at 550 (Sept. 8) (“Mr. Gerry movd. that no officer be app[ointe]d 
but to offices created by the Constitution or by law—This was rejected as unnecessary by six 
no’s & five ays.”); see also id. at 553 (“Mr. Gerry repeated his motion . . . , which was again 
negatived.”). 
85. Id. at 599 (Sept. 12) (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent 
of the senate, shall appoint . . . all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are 
not herein otherwise provided for.”). 
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of law, or in the heads of Departments”
86
—that is, it accepted the Inferior Offic-
ers Appointments Clause.
87
 Second, the Convention added the final phrase to 
the Appointments Clause: “and which shall be established by law.”
88
 With these 
final changes, the language of the Constitution’s Appointments Clause came to-
gether. 
It is worth highlighting in this drafting history the seemingly unanimous 
support for the Clause’s substance. Although several such amendments were re-
jected, these rejections were made at the “urg[ing]” of eminent members “that 
[it] could not be necessary.”
89
 Of course, from the textual analysis above, we 
know that the Constitution’s allocation of office-creation responsibilities would 
have remained doubtful without Madison’s final amendment. But no one in the 
Convention—at least so far as Farrand’s Records show
90
—advocated for the con-
tinuation of the British Constitution’s approach. With this silence, we can con-
firm the conclusions compelled by the Constitution’s text and structure. 
2. United States v. Maurice 
In addition to these conventional arguments from text, structure, and draft-
ing history, an early judicial opinion lends further support to this interpretation. 
While riding circuit, Chief Justice Marshall was presented with the opportunity 
to interpret the Appointments Clause in United States v. Maurice.
91
 Although he 
conceded that the Clause was not “entirely unambiguous,” Chief Justice Marshall 
ultimately concluded that the Clause vested exclusive control in Congress. He 
began by identifying two possible readings: 
[I]t is not perfectly clear whether the words “which” offices “shall be es-
tablished by law,” are to be construed as ordaining, that all offices of the 
 
86. Id. at 627 (Sept. 15). 
87. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Note, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers and the 
President’s Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991, 993 (1993); Kevin H. Rhodes, Structure 
Without Foundation: A Reply to Professor Froomkin, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1406, 1412 (1994). 
88. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 8, at 628 (Sept. 15). 
89. Id. at 345 (Aug. 20). 
90. See generally Mary Sarah Bilder, How Bad Were the Official Records of the Federal Convention?, 
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1620 (2012) (discussing the reliability of and uses for Farrand’s Rec-
ords); Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 as a 
Source of the Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitution, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1707 (2012) 
(similar). 
91. 26 F. Cas. 1211 (C.C.D. Va. 1823) (No. 15,747). 
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United States shall be established by law, or merely as limiting the pre-
vious general words to such offices as shall be established by law.
92
 
In other words, the Constitution’s text could be read broadly to require that Con-
gress establish all offices or it could be read extraordinarily narrowly such that 
the Appointments Clause’s strictures applied only to those offices that had al-
ready been “established by Law.” 
Chief Justice Marshall went on to consider these two possibilities in more 
detail. “Understood in the first sense,” he reasoned, the Appointments Clause 
would institute two distinct requirements: (1) “all offices . . . shall be established 
by law” and (2) the President should “appoint to all offices of the United 
States.”
93
 Under the second reading, the Appointments Clause applies to “those 
offices only which might be established by law.”
94
 In other words, the second 
reading would institute a conditional rule: if Congress establishes an office, then 
the President should appoint the officers according to the Clause’s strictures; 
otherwise, the President (or those “entrusted with the execution of the laws”) 
could both “create in all laws of legislative omission[] such offices as might be 
deemed necessary” and “afterwards to fill those offices.”
95
 
Therefore, with this “last sense” of the Clause, Chief Justice Marshall con-
sidered a reading that granted even more power to the executive than the British 
system. As under the British Constitution, this reading would allow the Presi-
dent to “create . . . such offices as might be deemed necessary.”
96
 But it would go 
further still, as it would also allow “those who might be entrusted with the exe-
cution of the laws” to do the same.
97
 
Chief Justice Marshall rejected this position. Although he was unsure 
“whether this question ha[d] ever occurred to the legislat[ure] or executive of 
the United States,” he selected the first interpretation because “it accords best 
with the general spirit of the constitution, which seems to have arranged the cre-
ation of office among legislative powers.”
98
 Buttressing this structural claim, 
Chief Justice Marshall argued that the Inferior Officers Appointments Clause 
“indicates an opinion in the framers of the constitution, that they had provided 
 




96. Id.  
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
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for all cases of offices.”
99
 He concluded, “The constitution then is understood to 
declare, that all officers of the United States, except in cases where the constitu-
tion itself may otherwise provide, shall be established by law.”
100
 The interpre-
tation in Maurice is particularly good evidence of the Constitution’s meaning. 
The 1823 decision was the earliest major judicial opinion interpreting the 
Clause,
101
 and Chief Justice Marshall’s opinions generally carry great weight.
102
 
B. Early Constitutional Practice 
Early practice also supports the position that Congress—and not the Presi-
dent—should create offices. The House of Representatives, the Senate, and Pres-
ident Washington all acted in ways that suggest that the President needed au-
thorizing legislation before appointing officers. For example, the House of 
Representatives passed a series of statutes—the War Department Act, the For-
eign Affairs Act, and the Treasury Act—that created offices for the President to 
fill.
103
 The Treasury Act, for instance, stated that “there shall be a Department of 
Treasury, in which shall be the following officers, namely: a Secretary of the 
Treasury, to be deemed head of the department; a Comptroller, an Auditor, a 
Treasurer, a Register, and an Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, which 
assistant shall be appointed by the said Secretary.”
104
 The War Department Act 
 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 1214. 
101. See Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 
908, 933-37 (2017) (discussing the well-established canon that “contemporanea expositio est op-
tima et fortissima in lege—or, ‘a contemporaneous exposition is the best and most powerful in 
law’”). 
102. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 20 (1890) (describing Chief Justice Marshall as “one who 
seldom used words without due reflection”). 
103. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65 (establishing the Department of Treasury); Act of Aug. 
7, 1789, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 49 (establishing the Department of War); Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, 1 
Stat. 28 (establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs). 
104. § 1, 1 Stat. at 65. Interestingly, Congress later passed a statute that would allow the Secretary 
of the Treasury to appoint as many clerks as deemed necessary. Act of Sept. 11, 1789, ch. 13, 
§ 2, 1 Stat. 67, 68 (“[T]he heads of the three departments [including Secretary of the Treas-
ury] first above mentioned, shall appoint such clerks therein respectively as they shall find 
necessary . . . .”). Because this statute delegates limitless authority to hire new clerks, it might 
violate that provision of the Appointments Clause that all offices be “established by Law.” See 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Under a strict reading of the Clause, Congress must specify the 
number of offices, else the executive branch could circumvent the Clause by unilaterally ap-
pointing endless officers. Nonetheless, two possible arguments justify this particular statute. 
First, the offices would still be “established by Law,” and the duties—even if not the number—
would remain constrained by the statute. By analogy, these absolute delegations of narrow 
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and Foreign Affairs Act contained similar language. David Currie claims that 
when the House of Representatives drafted and passed these statutes, the repre-




By contrast, the Senate briefly debated whether the President should have 
the authority to create new offices with the consent of the Senate. When pre-
sented with the House’s version of the Foreign Affairs Act, Senator William 
Maclay commented: 
I [do not] see the necessity of having made this business a Subject of 
legislation. [T]he point of View in which it presented itself to me was[] 
[t]hat the President should signify to the Senate[] his desire of appoint-
ing a Minister of foreign affairs, and nominate the Man and so of the 
other necessary departments. [I]f the Senate agreed to the necessity of 
the office and the Man they would concur, if not, they would negative. & 
ca. the House would get the Business before them when Salaries came to 




His argument more closely tracked the process under the British Constitution. 
Because the monarch is “emphatically and truly styled the fountain of honor,” 
Hamilton recalled in The Federalist, he “not only appoints all offices, but can cre-
ate offices.”
107
 To Senator Maclay, the House’s attempt to establish a precedent 
that required congressional office creation was an act of self-aggrandizement by 
 
office-creation authority could be like the “permanent appropriations” that satisfy the Appro-
priations Clause. See Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1378-81 (1988). 
Second, the clerks might not be “Officers of the United States,” but rather employees, and so 
the Appointments Clause wouldn’t apply at all. See, e.g., Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 n.162 (1976) (per curiam) (“Employees are lesser function-
aries . . . .”). See generally Mascott, supra note 33 (attempting to define the original meaning of 
“officers”). 
105. See CURRIE, supra note 4, at 36 n.205 (quoting Casper, supra note 3, at 233). 
106. Diary of William Maclay (July 9, 1789), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL 
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1789-1791, at 104, 104-05 (Charlene Bangs 
Bickford et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]; see also Casper, supra note 
3, at 225 (discussing this statement). 
107. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 51, at 421; see also EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: 
OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 69-70 (4th rev. ed. 1957) (explaining that it was “an element 
of the royal prerogative in England to create offices as well as to appoint to them”). 








President Washington’s behavior also seems to concede that Congress would 
enjoy the exclusive power of office creation. Most important, his early nomina-
tions filled offices only after they had been created by acts of Congress. For ex-
ample, on July 31st, Congress passed a statute that provided for the “collection 
of the duties imposed by law on the tonnage of ships and vessels, and on goods, 
wares and merchandises imported into the United States.”
110
 The complex, tech-
nical statute divided the states into districts, delineated ports of entry and ports 
of delivery,
111
 and provided for three kinds of officers—naval officers, collectors, 
and surveyors—that would ensure the collection of tariffs.
112
 On August 3rd, 
President Washington sent a letter to the Senate with his nominations.
113
 The 
letter carefully filled each of the offices created by this statute—and only those 
offices.
114
 Likewise, although the President had been in communication with Al-
exander Hamilton early in his term,
115
 he did not nominate Hamilton to serve as 
Secretary of the Treasury until after Congress established the office.
116
 
Nonetheless, some early practice does suggest that the President and Con-
gress were not overly scrupulous about the strictures of the Appointments 
Clause. When Congress established executive departments that had existed un-
der the Articles of Confederation, the officers sometimes remained within the 
department without presidential appointment. For example, Henry Knox simply 
 
108. See Diary of William Maclay, supra note 106. 
109. See id. 
110. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 1, 1 Stat. 29, 29. 
111. See Port of Entry, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968); Port of Delivery, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY (4th ed. 1968) 
112. See § 1, 1 Stat. at 29-35 (delineating districts, ports of entry, and ports of delivery, and estab-
lishing officers to attend to their duties at those ports); §§ 5-9, 1 Stat. at 36-38 (articulating 
the distinct duties of the three types of officers). The actual rates for the duties were estab-
lished in statutes passed previously. See Act of July 20, 1789, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 27 (setting duties on 
tonnage); Act of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24 (establishing duties on goods, wares, and mer-
chandise). 
113. See Letter from George Washington, President of the U.S., to the U.S. Senate (Aug. 3, 1789), 
in 3 PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 3, at 377, 377-82. 
114. See id. 
115. See, e.g., Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, President of the U.S. (May 
5, 1789), in 2 PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 3, at 211, 211-14. 
116. See Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65 (establishing the Treasury Department); Letter from 
George Washington, President of the U.S., to the U.S. Senate (Sept. 11, 1789), in 4 PAPERS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 3, at 19, 19 (nominating Hamilton as Secretary of the Treas-
ury). 
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continued his post as Secretary of War between the Constitution’s ratification 
and the establishment of the Department of War.
117
 After Congress established 
the Department of War, he continued for a month in that position without re-
appointment.
118
 But he was soon nominated and confirmed.
119
 Likewise, Con-
gress readopted a statute that created a Board of Commissioners to settle ac-
counts between the states and the national government, but the Board’s 
members continued with their duties without appointment by the President.
120
 
Still, President Washington did not appoint any new members to the Board of 
Commissioners until Congress reauthorized it.
121
 Instead, he waited until after 
its reauthorization to appoint a Commissioner to a vacancy that had been open 
for some time during his presidency.
122
 Similarly, President Washington reap-
pointed Governor Arthur St. Clair “in conformity to the Law re-establishing the 
Government of the Western Territory [i.e., the Northwest Territory].”
123
 
President Washington also consulted with the holdovers of the executive de-
partments under the Articles of Confederation. Writing to John Jay in the Office 
of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs under the old government, President Wash-
ington claimed that he was “desirous of employing [himself] in obtaining an 
 
117. See, e.g., Letter from Henry Knox, Sec’y of War, to George Washington, President of the U.S. 
(July 6, 1789), in 3 PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 3, at 123, 123 (sending an 
official letter from the War Office). 
118. See, e.g., Henry Knox, A Statement of the Troops in the Service of the United States (Aug. 8, 
1789), in 3 PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 3, at 413, 416. 
119. See S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 25-26 (1789); see also Act of Sept. 11, 1789, ch. 13, 
§ 2, 1 Stat. 67, 68 (establishing the salary for the Secretary of War and other top officials). 
120. See Act of Aug. 5, 1789, ch. 6, § 1, 1 Stat. 49, 49 (providing for the “settlement of accounts 
between the United States and the individual States”). 
121. See id.; Letter from George Washington, President of the U.S., to the U.S. Senate (Aug. 6, 
1789), in 3 PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 3, at 394, 394 (“By the act for settling 
the accounts between the United States and individual States, a person is to be appointed to 
fill the vacant seat at the Board of Commissioners for settling the accounts . . . ; I therefore 
nominate John Kean . . . to fill the vacant seat at the said Board of Commissioners.”). 
122. See Letter from Abraham Baldwin, U.S. Representative, to George Washington, President of 
the U.S. (Apr. 30, 1789), in 2 PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 3, at 148, 148 (re-
signing his position on the Board of Commissioners); Letter from George Washington, Pres-
ident of the U.S., to Abraham Baldwin, U.S. Representative (May 7, 1789), in 2 PAPERS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 3, at 224, 224 (“I have duly received your letter . . . and shall 
cause it to be filed in the proper office as soon as the necessary arrangemt [sic] of departments shall 
have been made.” (emphasis added)). 
123. See Letter from George Washington, President of the U.S., to the U.S. Senate (Aug. 18, 1789), 
in 3 PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 3, at 495, 495; see also Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 
8, 1 Stat. 50 (readopting the Northwest Ordinance). 
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acquaintance with the real situation of the several great Departments.”
124
 He 
sought information also from the former Board of Treasury and the Post Office, 
in addition to the Office of Foreign Affairs.
125
 Nonetheless, President Washing-
ton noted that “the present unsettled state of the Executive Departments” meant 
that he “d[id] not conceive it expedient to call upon [Jay] for information offi-
cially.”
126
 Similarly, writing to the head of the Post Office, he stated: “As I have 
(without doing it officially) requested [information] from the heads of the sev-
eral Executive Departments . . . , I have thought fit to ask, in the same informal 
manner, for specific information [regarding] . . . the Post Office.”
127
 These early 
consultations do not represent President Washington’s avoidance of the require-
ments of the Appointments Clause. Instead, his emphasis on the informality of 
the discussions underscores that he thought it beyond his power to rely on these 
appointees without congressional approval.
128
 
In short, President Washington’s actions during his first term confirm that 
the Constitution gives Congress the exclusive office-creation authority. These 
early practices are particularly good evidence of the Constitution’s meaning be-
cause of President Washington’s unique role within the nation’s history. After all, 
President Washington was acutely aware that his actions would “have great and 
 
124. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington, President of the U.S., to John Jay (June 8, 1789), in 
2 PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 3, at 455, 455. 
125. Letter from George Washington, President of the U.S., to Ebenezer Hazard, U.S. Postmaster 
Gen. (June 8, 1789), in 2 PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 3, at 454, 454 (request-
ing information on Post Office); Letter from the Bd. of Treasury to George Washington, Pres-
ident of the U.S. (June 9, 1789), in 2 PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 3, at 456, 
456 (notifying Washington that the Board of Treasury would provide the requested infor-
mation on itself). 
126. Letter from George Washington to John Jay, supra note 124, at 455 (emphasis added). 
127. Letter from George Washington to Ebenezer Hazard, supra note 125, at 454 (emphasis added). 
President Washington sought similar information from the Board of Treasury. See, e.g., Letter 
from the Bd. of Treasury to George Washington, supra note 125, at 456. 
128. President Washington’s first appointment also occurred before the Congress had created any 
executive-branch offices. On June 15th, President Washington appointed William Esquire to 
replace Thomas Jefferson as the Minister of the United States at the Court of France. See Letter 
from George Washington, President of the U.S., to the U.S. Senate (June 15, 1789), in 2 PA-
PERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 3, at 498, 498 n.3; see also List of the Public Acts of 
Congress, 1 Stat. xvii (1789) (showing that only the Oaths of Office Act had been passed by 
June 15th). But this appointee was an “Ambassador,” “public Minister,” or “Consul,” positions 
that need not be “established by Law” under the Appointments Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. 
II, § 2; see also infra Section I.D. 
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durable consequences from their having been established at the commencement 
of a new general Government.”
129
 
C. Preconstitutional History 
The Constitution’s commitment of the office-creation power to Congress 
makes good sense in light of preconstitutional history. The Founders’ appoint-
ments system purposefully broke with the British tradition.
130
 Defending the 
Constitution in The Federalist, Hamilton distinguished the Constitution’s Presi-
dent from Great Britain’s Crown: “The king of Great Britain is emphatically and 
truly styled the fountain of honor. He not only appoints to all offices, but can 
create offices.”
131
  Doubtless, Hamilton wrote with Blackstone close at hand. 
Blackstone’s Commentaries, like The Federalist, claimed that “the king is likewise 
the fountain of honour, of office, and of privilege . . . . For the same reason there-
fore that honours are in the disposal of the king, offices ought to be so likewise; 
and as the king may create new titles, so may he create new offices.”
132
 
Within England, this prerogative arguably allowed the monarch to ensure a 
functioning and effective government.
133
 But the extensive use of patronage to 
 
129. Letter from George Washington to John Adams, supra note 3, at 246-47; see also supra note 3 
and accompanying text. 
130. Cf. Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 618 (1850) (“But in the distribution of political 
power between the great departments of government, there is such a wide difference between 
the power conferred on the President of the United States, and the authority and sovereignty 
which belong to the English crown, that it would be altogether unsafe to reason from any 
supposed resemblance between them . . . . Our own Constitution and form of government 
must be our only guide.”). 
131. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 51, at 421 (emphasis added). But see THE FEDERALIST NO. 
76, at 454 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (forgetting to include the clause 
“which shall be established by law” when quoting the Appointments Clause). 
132. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at*261-62 (emphasis added). Blackstone’s description of the 
monarch’s power functions as both description and justification of the constitutional order. 
See DAVID LINDSAY KEIR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN SINCE 1485, at 
293 (9th ed. 1969). Hamilton might have overstated the King’s power, however. Blackstone 
notes that the King was still restrained: “he cannot create new offices with new fees annexed 
to them, nor annex new fees to old offices; for this would be a tax upon the subject, which 
cannot be imposed but by act of parliament.” 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at *262. 
133. See GOLDWIN SMITH, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 372 (1990); Arch-
ibald S. Foord, The Waning of ‘The Influence of the Crown,’ 62 ENG. HIST. REV. 484, 484 (1947). 
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secure political power came to be seen as a corrupting influence in the political 
system.
134
 Steven Calabresi and then-Professor Joan Larsen have explained:  
It would be hard to overstate the effect that the King’s unscrupulous use 
of patronage (and the system of “royal influence”) had on the conduct of 
politics in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England . . . . A whole 
generation of young men went to Parliament with the express purpose 
of making their fortunes by obtaining an office.
135
  
Likewise, Goldwin Smith writes that “[t]he importance of patronage, family 
connection, and ‘influence’ in eighteenth century politics cannot easily be over-
stressed,”
136
 and he defined this influence as “the various methods by which the 
king and his ministers could persuade a majority of the members of Parliament 
to vote for government measures . . . [with] appeal . . . to men hungry with am-
bition or greed or both.”
137
 
In time, Americans began to lament the corrupting influence of the English 
monarch.
138
 According to Gordon Wood, for example, the Crown’s influence 
over life in the colonies had contributed to “a more elusive social and political 
 
134. See, e.g., KEIR, supra note 132, at 328 (“Even the least important appointments in the gift of the 
Crown were gradually drawn into this system for inducing political support by offering ma-
terial rewards. To treat subordinate executive positions as political spoils was obviously detri-
mental to efficient administration . . . . With the use of existing offices for electoral purposes 
went the wholesale creation of new offices.”); TODD, supra note 51, at 165 (“Persons were ap-
pointed to places of trust and emolument, or removed therefrom, on mere political grounds, 
and in furtherance of political intrigues . . . . Sinecure offices, gifts of places in reversion, and 
secret pensions for political services to the court were multiplied; and the illegitimate influ-
ence of the crown was thereby greatly increased.”). 
135. Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation 
of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1053 (1994) (citing L.B. NAMIER, THE STRUCTURE OF 
POLITICS AT THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 1-61 (1929)); see also id. (“The King’s patronage 
power gave him two key tools through which he could control Parliament. First, by promoting 
influential Members of Parliament (M.P.s) to ministerial office, the King could win their back-
ing in Parliament for his programs. Second, by dangling the prospect of a lucrative office, 
pension, or title of nobility, the King could induce even non-office holding M.P.s to support 
him in hopes of benefiting from the royal largesse.”). After the Glorious Revolution, the Set-
tlement Act “contained a strict incompatibility rule” that would render officers of the Crown 
“ineligible to serve in the House of Commons,” but it was “never put into effect.” Id. at 1055-
56. 
136. SMITH, supra note 133, at 396. 
137. Id. at 396 n.1. 
138. See id. at 1054 n.27 (collecting critiques from the “‘left’ opposition both in England and Amer-
ica”); id. at 1056-57 (discussing the “indelible impression [left] on American memories” by 
the “corruption of the British system of influence”). 
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rancor that lent passion to the Revolutionary movement.”
139
 Springing from this 
supposed “fountain of honors,” the Crown had caused an “influx of new royal 
officials since 1763.”
140
 John Jay, writing to the citizens of Great Britain, accused 
these officials of incompetence and corruption: “We might tell of dissolute, 
weak, and wicked governors having been set over us; . . . of needy and ignorant 
dependants on great men advanced to the seats of justice, and to other places of 
trust and importance.”
141
 What’s more, American elites began to perceive cor-
ruption and dissipation in their own ranks, and they blamed the monarch
142
: 
“The Crown actually seemed to be bent on changing the character of American 
society,” Gordon Wood writes.
143
 “Throughout the society, . . . an artificial inter-
colonial aristocracy—springing ultimately from the honors and dignities be-
stowed by the Crown—was entrenching itself, consolidating and setting itself 
apart from the mass of American yeomen by its royal connections and courtier 
spirit of luxury and dissipation.”
144
 
Besides the issues of the corrupt and incompetent aristocracy, unilateral cre-
ation and appointment of offices left legislatures too dependent on the executive 
branch.
145
 Colonial governors had “used their power to influence and control the 
other parts of the constitution” by “appointing [representatives] to executive or 
judicial posts, or by offering them opportunities for profits through the dispens-
ing of government contracts and public money.”
146
 Ultimately, these concerns 
 
139. WOOD, supra note 11, at 79. 
140. Id. at 78-79. 
141. John Jay, Address to the People of Great Britain (Sept. 5, 1774), in 1 THE CORRESPONDENCE 
AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 17, 26 (Henry P. Johnston ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 
1890); see also WOOD, supra note 11, at 78-79 (“And in the eyes of the Whigs America possessed 
too many of these ‘fawning parasites and cringing courtiers,’ too much soothing and flattering 
of great men . . . . Indeed, on the eve of the Revolution it seemed to some Whigs that the 
Crown’s influence was turning the social world upside down: ‘Virtue, Integrity, and Ability’ 
had become ‘the Objects of Malice, Hatred and Revenge of the Men in Power,’ while ‘folly, 
Vice, and Villany’ were being everywhere ‘cherished and supported.’”). 
142. See WOOD, supra note 11, at 107-14. 
143. Id. at 111. 
144. Id. 
145. See Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 135, at 1055-57. 
146. WOOD, supra note 11, at 156-57; see also id. at 157-58 (“Even though the governors in most of 
the [revolutionary] constitutions no longer controlled the appointment of executive officials, 
so infecting and so incompatible with the public liberty or the representation of the people 
was magisterial power believed to be that the Americans felt compelled to isolate their legis-
latures from any sort of executive influence or impingement . . . .”). 
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worked their way into the Declaration of Independence: “He has erected a mul-
titude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harrass our people, 
and eat out their substance.”
147
 
Given this unscrupulous use of the appointment power, “Americans [in 
1776] felt compelled to isolate their legislatures from any sort of executive influ-
ence or impingement.”
148
 These concerns not only animated the movement to-
ward provisions like the Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause,
149
 but also moti-
vated the complete withdrawal of the office-creating power from the executive 
branch.
150
 The Articles of Confederation and many newly drafted state constitu-
tions did just that, vesting the authority in legislatures or special councils.
151
 For 
example, the New York Constitution created a Council of Appointment.
152
 Alt-
hough most of the offices within New York were established by custom, the 




The Constitution drafted in Philadelphia, however, would tack towards a 
middle road—rejecting the British Crown’s plenary office-creation authority, but 
vesting the selection and control of these offices in the President.
154
 By then, it had 
 
147. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 12 (U.S. 1776). 
148. WOOD, supra note 11, at 158. 
149. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for 
which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United 
States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased 
during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Mem-
ber of either House during his Continuance in Office.”); WOOD, supra note 11, at 158 n.58 
(listing similar state constitutional provisions); Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 135, at 1052-97 
(discussing the history behind the Incompatibility Clause); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMER-
ICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 378-81 (2012) (discussing this Clause). 
150. See Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 135, at 1058 (“In addition, no state entrusted its executive 
with a power to create offices (or titles of nobility) at will. The office-creating power was in 
all cases vested with the legislature.”). 
151. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, paras. 4-5; WOOD, supra note 11, at 449 
(“The governors’ power of appointment was clipped . . . all in the name of Montesquieu’s 
principle of the separation of powers.”). 
152. See WOOD, supra note 11. 
153. See J.M. Gitterman, The Council of Appointment in New York, 7 POL. SCI. Q. 80, 98-99 (1892) 
(recounting that the Council of Appointment independently created and distributed offices 
for political reasons). 
154. See generally United States v. Weiss, 510 U.S. 163, 184 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
delegates to the Philadelphia Convention could draw on their experiences with two flawed 
methods of appointment.”); CORWIN, supra note 107, at 70 (“The Constitution . . . assigns the 
power to create offices to Congress, while it deals with the appointing power in . . . Article 
II . . . .”); id. at 70-75 (detailing the President’s appointing power under the Constitution). 
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become clear that the decision to lodge the exclusive appointment power in the 
legislature had become the “principal source of division and faction.”
155
 Return-
ing a measure of the appointment power to the President cut against the lessons 
learned under British rule, but the Constitution as written still excluded the 
power of office creation from the President.
156
 What remains, then, is a careful 
institutional balance: on the one hand, it avoids the corruption and inefficiency 
caused by vesting unilateral office creation and appointment in the legislature; 
on the other, it forbids the kind of unilateral office creation that had, under the 
British Constitution, so plagued the American colonists. 
D. Some Exceptions to the Rule 
So far, this Part has ignored a few notable exceptions to the Appointments 
Clause’s scope. Most significantly, the requirement that all offices be “established 
by Law” has not been interpreted to extend to “Ambassadors, other public Min-
isters and Consuls.”
157
 In this Section, I show why this exception makes good 
sense in light of history, structure, and the law of nations. While the President 
should have greater control over the creation of offices concerning foreign rela-
tions, Congress must have exclusive control over the creation of domestic offices, 
including Justices of the Supreme Court. 
 
155. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 904 n.4 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the 
judgment) (quoting WOOD, supra note 11, at 407); see also WOOD, supra note 11, at 403-09 
(discussing the dangers of vesting power in the legislature); Blumoff, supra note 9, at 1062-
70 (cataloguing debates at the Convention about the appropriate appointing authority); cf. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 131, at 456 (rejecting appointment by an “assembly of 
men” because it would lead to “a full display of all the private and party likings and dislikes, 
partialities and antipathies, attachments and animosities, which are felt by those who com-
pose the assembly,” and because the choice “made under such circumstances, will of course be 
the result either of a victory gained by one party over the other, or of a compromise between 
the parties”). 
156. See WOOD, supra note 11, at 551 (discussing the decision to vest the appointment power in the 
President).  
157. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see CORWIN, supra note 107, at 70-71; Ambassadors and Other 
Public Ministers of the United States, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 186, 193-94 (1855) (“In a word, the 
power to appoint diplomatic agents, and to select for employment any one out of the varieties 
of the class, according to his judgment of the public service, is a constitutional function of the 
President, not derived from, nor limitable by, Congress, but requiring only the ultimate con-
currence of the Senate; and so it was understood in the early practice of the Government.”). 
But cf. Case of the Office of Minister to Venezuela, 12 Op. Att’y Gen. 457 (1868) (finding that 
the President has no legal right to fill the office of minister to Venezuela after Congress crim-
inalized appointment to the office and refused to appropriate funds for the provision). 
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Textually, “which shall be established by Law” can be interpreted to modify 
the Clause in one of two ways. First, the phrase might modify all of the govern-
ment agents in the Clause—that is, “Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United 
States.” Second, it might be read to modify only “other Officers of the United 
States.” Under this second reading, the Clause simply assumes the existence of 
the before-mentioned offices of “Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
suls, [and] Judges of the supreme Court.”
158
 Professor Edward Corwin offers 
this textual interpretation.
159
 Given background assumptions about the relation-
ship between the law of nations and the Constitution, this second reading makes 
more sense.
160
 Attorney General Cushing, for example, reasoned that the offices 
were “derived from the law of nations.”
161
 Finally, historical practice supports the 
exception.
162
 Practice dating back to President Washington has exempted am-
bassadors from the requirement that Congress first create an office.
163
 President 
Washington’s first appointment, for instance, replaced Thomas Jefferson as the 
Minister of the United States at the Court of France, and he lacked statutory 
authority to do so.
164
 
This exception for foreign officers, however, raises a curious question of text 
and structure: why doesn’t the same exception apply to the “Judges of the su-
preme Court”? If the phrase “which shall be established by Law” applies only to 
“all other Officers of the United States,” then both “Ambassadors [et al.]” and 
 
158. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
159. See CORWIN, supra note 107, at 69-70 (reasoning that the Constitution itself created the Su-
preme Court, and that the ambassadors and other public ministers were created by the law of 
nations). 
160. Discussion of the relationship between the law of nations (or customary international law) 
and domestic law is well beyond the scope of this Note. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. 
ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 712-17 (7th ed. 
2015) (canvassing the literature on “customary international law and federal common law”). 
For recent discussions of this relationship, see Nathan Chapman, Due Process of War, 94 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 27) (on file with author) (“By the 
late eighteenth century, English common-law theorists recognized that the law of nations was 
part of the law of the land, a view American jurists embraced.”); and Ryan M. Scoville, Ad Hoc 
Diplomats, 68 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 7) (on file with author) (claiming 
that “a wealth of original historical sources show that the founders understood the law of 
nations as supplying the definition of the term ‘public Ministers’”). 
161. 7 Op. Att’y Gen. at 194. 
162. See CORWIN, supra note 107, at 70 (noting that “until 1855 Congress left it entirely with the 
President” to appoint these foreign officials). 
163. See supra note 128. 
164. Id. 
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“Judges of the Supreme Court” would be excluded. Under this reading, inferior 
federal judges would need to have their offices created by Congress,
165
 but the 
President and Senate could appoint a Justice of the Supreme Court alone. In-
deed, such an interpretation could allow the President and Senate to appoint—
without passing a statute—a tenth or eleventh Justice. Worse still, the House 
would have no ex post say through the Appropriations Clause because the Con-
stitution mandates the salaries of federal judges.
166
  When Senator Maclay 
(wrongly) defended the President’s power to unilaterally create offices, he em-
phasized that the House would retain some control through subsequent appro-
priations.
167
 No such backstop protects the House’s power in this case because a 
federal judge’s salary “shall not be diminished.”
168
 This interpretation, then, 
seems especially doubtful: it would cut the chamber with unquestioned demo-
cratic bona fides
169
 out of a crucial decision about the institutional design of the 
least accountable branch. 
Despite this textual absurdity, both historical practice and structural consid-
erations gloss the text to forbid the President and Senate from circumventing the 
House’s role. First, history’s gloss confirms that the President and Senate may 
not appoint Supreme Court Justices without the House’s prior authorizing stat-
ute. In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress established a six-man Supreme Court, 
and the President complied.
170
 Even President Roosevelt’s court-packing plan 
relied on a statute.
171
 Were it constitutionally possible to act with just the Senate, 
President Roosevelt would have done so. Second, the Constitution gives the 
President greater control over “Ambassadors,” “Consuls,” and “other Public Min-




165. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
166. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
167. See supra text accompanying notes 106-109. 
168. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Of course, if Congress refused to appropriate salaries for these ques-
tionable new Justices, the other branches could not do anything about it. See Jed Glickstein, 
After Midnight: The Circuit Judges and the Repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, 24 YALE J.L. & HU-
MAN. 543, 560-61 (2012) (noting that the “midnight judges” whose offices were abolished 
when President Jefferson and the Republicans repealed the Judiciary Act of 1801 were unable 
to recover their salaries); Stith, supra note 104, at 1392 (arguing that there can be “no judicial 
enforcement of the Constitution’s appropriations requirements against Congress itself”). 
169. See supra text accompanying notes 67-71. 
170. See AMAR, supra note 6, at 215. 
171. See Stephan O. Kline, Revisiting FDR’s Court Packing Plan: Are the Current Attacks on Judicial 
Independence So Bad?, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 863, 909-10, 910 n.274 (1999) (discussing the 
specifics of the plan). 
172. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800) (statement of Rep. Marshall); see also Zivotofsky ex rel. Zi-
votofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084-94 (2015) (discussing the President’s 
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This enhanced foreign-affairs authority helps explain why the President should 
have greater authority to act without the House’s prior blessings. What’s more, 
the Constitution elsewhere excludes the House—but includes the Senate—in in-
ternational issues.
173
 And finally, unlike with foreign officials, the law of nations 
had nothing at all to say about the Supreme Court. 
With strong historical precedent and structural arguments against a power 
to create positions for new Supreme Court Justices without the House, any Pres-
ident and Senate embarking on such an adventurous and unprecedented Court-
packing plan could be soundly criticized for violating the Constitution. There-
fore, the Appointments Clause’s “established by Law” requirement should be in-
terpreted to apply to all domestic offices, including to “Judges of the supreme 
Court.” 
* * * 
This Part argued that the Constitution’s text and structure, as informed by 
the experience of Americans under British rule and early state constitutions, give 
Congress the exclusive power of office creation. This constitutional commitment 
affirms Congress’s role as first among equals and institution-builder-in-chief. 
This textual, structural, and historical argument has important implications for 
the doctrinal analysis of separation-of-powers questions. The next Part explores 
these implications. 
i i .  implications of congress’s exclusive power of office 
creation 
Because the Appointments Clause sits within Article II, most discussions of 
the provision focus on the limits and restrictions it places on the President or 
officials within the executive branch.
174
 The Court has long held, for instance, 
that government “employees” need not satisfy the strictures of the Appointments 
 
exclusive power over the recognition of foreign states); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Ex-
port Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (quoting early congressional statements identifying the 
President as the nation’s representative in foreign relations). 
173. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (outlining the treaty power). 
174. Cf. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 904 n.4 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the 
judgment) (“The Court apparently thinks that the Appointments Clause was designed to 
check executive despotism. This is . . . quite simply contrary to historical fact.” (citation omit-
ted)). Justice Scalia is right that the Appointments Clause serves to withdraw powers granted 
to legislatures under the Articles of Confederation and under the early state constitutions. 
That said, the Clause does hamper executive power if compared to the baseline of the British 
Constitution. 




 and the Clause by its terms applies differently to principal and inferior 
officers. The category that an executive-branch agent falls into—employee, infe-
rior officer, or principal officer—constrains the executive branch’s authority to 
hire or appoint her. Therefore, commentators have often attempted to distin-
guish between officers and employees
176




But this Note’s unique contribution is to highlight what the Appointments 
Clause says about Congress. This emphasis on Article I expands the focus from 
the executive branch and highlights the Clause’s interbranch implications. To 
show this, this Note discusses three related sets of constitutional questions: (1) 
Can Congress impose statutory qualifications on who can hold particular offices, 
and can it insulate executive-branch officials from presidential control?
178
 (2) 
When, if at all, can the President (or an executive-branch official) fill temporary 
vacancies without using the Recess Appointments Clause? (3) How should the 
Court draw the line between officers and employees for purposes of the Appoint-
ments Clause?
179
 I address each in turn. 
A. Qualifications and Control 
The Constitution carefully separates the powers of office creation and of ap-
pointment and control of officers. In this Section, I argue that this distinction 
sheds light on two perennial questions related to Appointments Clause litiga-
tion: (1) to what extent may Congress impose statutory qualifications when it 
 
175. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
176. See, e.g., Mascott, supra note 33, at 451 nn.29-39 (canvassing the literature); West, supra note 
33; see also Freytag, 501 U.S. at 880 (labeling as employees the group of officials who have less 
authority than inferior officers). 
177. See, e.g., Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 
(1988); see also Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law?: The Court’s New Ap-
pointments Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1135-37 (1998) (arguing that the in-
dependent counsel created by the Ethics in Government Act is not an inferior officer); Adrian 
Vermeule, Morrison v. Olson Is Bad Law, LAWFARE (June 9, 2017), https://www 
.lawfareblog.com/morrison-v-olson-bad-law [https://perma.cc/4QYM-6XDQ] (arguing 
that Morrison is “anticanonical”). 
178. For a discussion of statutory qualifications, see Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Two Appointments 
Clauses: Statutory Qualifications for Federal Officers, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745 (2008). For a 
discussion of presidential control over executive-branch offices, compare, for example, Steven 
G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 
541 (1994), with Sunstein & Lessig, supra note 71. 
179. See generally Buckley, 424 U.S.; Mascott, supra note 33, at 451-52 (discussing the literature on 
the employee/officer distinction); West, supra note 33 (setting forth an employee/officer dis-
tinction in line with the Constitution’s text and structure and Supreme Court precedent). 
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creates offices, and (2) to what extent may it insulate officers from the President’s 
control? I argue that Congress’s exclusive power over office creation explains 
why Congress may impose qualifications even though it cannot insulate officers 
from the President’s control with for-cause removal provisions.
180
 
1. Statutory Qualifications 
Congress’s complete authority over office creation should generally include 
the lesser authority to impose conditions on offices.
181
 Qualifications clauses 
date back to the Founding. The First Congress, for instance, mandated that the 
Attorney General be “learned in the law.”
182
 Since then, Congress has filled the 
statute books with qualifications, many of which were collected in Justice 
Brandeis’s Myers v. United States dissent. These statutes limited who could hold 
offices based on their citizenship, residency, professional attainments, and occu-
pational experience, and sometimes Congress named particular individuals to 
hold the office.
183
 Most recently, Congress has imposed partisan-balance re-
quirements on offices within supposedly bipartisan or independent agencies.
184
 
Despite the pedigree of these qualifications, Presidents and academics often 
argue that Article II precludes Congress from limiting whom the President can 
appoint.
185
 President Arthur, for example, objected to a provision that “the Pres-
ident be . . . authorized to nominate and, by and with the advice and consent of 
 
180. But see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 264 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The asser-
tion that the mere grant by the Constitution of executive power confers upon the President as 
a prerogative the unrestricted power of appointment and of removal from executive offices, 
except so far as otherwise expressly provided by the Constitution, is clearly inconsistent also 
with those statutes which restrict the exercise by the President of the power of nomination.”). 
181. See CORWIN, supra note 107, at 74 (“By far the most important limitation on presidential au-
tonomy in this field of power is, however, that which results from the fact that, in creating an 
office, Congress may stipulate the qualifications of appointees thereto.”). 
182. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93 
(1789); see also 28 U.S.C. § 505 (2018) (requiring the Solicitor General to be “learned in the 
law”). 
183. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 265-74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (listing hundreds of statutes); see also 
CORWIN, supra note 107, at 362 n.19 (citing Myers for this point). 
184. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. et al., Partisan Balance Requirements in the Age of New Formalism, 
90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 941, 984-85 (2015) (“The President must appoint a number of offi-
cials from an opposing political party to positions of strength within the executive branch—
whether or not she wishes to do so.”); see also id. at app., tbl.1 (listing partisan balance require-
ments within the administrative state). 
185. See, e.g., id. at 985-86 (“Article II does not permit Congress to aggrandize itself by dictating 
the persons whom the President will appoint to principal offices within the executive 
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the Senate, to appoint Fitz John Porter . . . to the position of colonel in the Army 
of the United States.”
186
 When President Arthur vetoed the provision, he argued: 
[T]his bill . . . will create a new office upon condition that the particular 
person designated shall be chosen to fill it. Such an act, as it seems to me, 
is either unnecessary and ineffective or it involves an encroachment by 
the legislative branch of the Government upon the authority of the Ex-
ecutive. As the Congress has no power under the Constitution to nomi-
nate or appoint an officer and cannot lawfully impose upon the President the 
duty of nominating or appointing to office any particular individual of its own 
selection, this bill, if it can fairly be construed as requiring the President 
to make the nomination and, by and with the advice and consent of the 




President Arthur’s argument applies most forcefully to statutes that single out 
one person who can take the job.
188
 But the same reasoning applies to other qual-
ifications; if Congress constrains who can be appointed, then it has interfered 
with the President’s authority to select the nominee and appoint the officer. 
Within recent literature, Hanah Volokh offers a unique two-tiered theory of 
qualifications clauses.
189
 Volokh powerfully (but ultimately unsuccessfully) ar-
gues that qualifications interfere with the President’s appointment and nomina-
tion powers. Some qualifications, she notes, require the President to select a 
nominee from a list “put forward by someone else,” such as a nominating com-
mission.
190
 These provisions infringe upon the President’s authority to nominate 
whomever he or she thinks is fitting. Other qualifications limit the President’s 
 
branch.”); Volokh, supra note 178, at 746-48 (arguing that the Constitution does not allow 
Congress to impose statutory qualifications with respect to principal officers). 
186. CORWIN, supra note 107, at 364 n.20. 
187. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 365 n.21 (quoting President Monroe’s statement that “Con-
gress ha[s] no right under the Constitution to impose any restraint by law on the power 
granted to the President so as to prevent his making a free selection of proper persons for 
these [newly created] offices from the whole body of his fellow citizens”). 
188. See 13 Op. Att’y Gen. 516 (1871); Note, Power of Appointment to Public Office Under the Federal 
Constitution, 42 HARV. L. REV. 426, 429-30 (1929); see also CORWIN, supra note 107, at 74-76, 
363-65 (discussing qualifications clauses). 
189. See generally Volokh, supra note 178 (arguing that Congress may impose qualifications on in-
ferior officers, whose appointments need not be subject to Senate confirmation, but may not 
impose qualifications on principal officers). 
190. Id. at 752. 
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appointment power by narrowing the field of candidates that he or she may law-
fully select.
191
 But Volokh is careful to narrow the scope of this claim: the Con-
stitution permits qualifications on inferior offices per the plain text of the Inferior 
Officers Appointments Clause,
192
 which gives Congress the authority to vest the 
power of appointment “by Law.”
193
 Therefore, the Clause allows Congress to de-
part downward from the advice-and-consent default and to impose qualifica-
tions as the price of this departure. 
But Volokh’s textual argument for this exception swallows up the original 
argument. Just as the Constitution gives Congress the authority to “by Law vest 
the Appointment of such inferior officers,” so too it gives Congress the responsi-
bility to “establish[] by Law” all offices. Both clauses make Congress responsible 
for office creation, and both circumscribe the President to his or her supervisory 
role under the Bicameralism and Presentment Clause. True enough, this lan-
guage “refers to the creation of the office, not the vesting of appointment 
power.”
194
 But it’s not clear why that should matter. After all, statutory qualifica-
tions can just as much be interpreted as conditions on the nature of the office 
itself (like, for example, its salary or duration) as limitations on the President’s 
appointment power. 
Put differently, qualifications do not “impose upon the President the duty of 
nominating or appointing,”
195
 but rather put him or her to the choice: select an 
officer that suits these qualifications or forgo the officer.
196
 Congress has the 
right to put the President to these choices. The Constitution creates only the of-
fices of the President and Vice President. After that, it puts it to Congress to “es-
tablish[] by Law” “all other Officers of the United States.” Qualifications do not 
impose an impermissible burden on the President because the Constitution 
 
191. See, e.g., id. at 773 n.133 (discussing restrictions based on political party). Anticipating an ob-
jection, Volokh also argues that qualifications cannot be construed as the Senate’s exercise of 
its “Advice and Consent” function for at least two reasons: (1) advice and consent must be 
given after nomination, see id. at 755 n.50 (citing FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 
821, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1993)); id. at 757, and (2) a statutory qualification represents a compromise 
judgment of the “Senate, the House of Representatives, and the President”—not just the Sen-
ate, see id. at 759. 
192. Id. at 747-65 (referring to the “Vested Appointments Clause”). 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 760 n.68. 
195. CORWIN, supra note 107, at 364 n.20 (quoting President Arthur). 
196. Cf. Samberg, supra note 19, at 1755-56 (“These laws should be interpreted not as putting limits 
on the choice of officer but rather as putting limits on the scope of the office.”). 
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promises the President nothing.
197
 Because every office is a privilege, a qualifi-
cation cannot be a coercive condition on the officer. Therefore, statutory qualifi-
cations should generally be constitutional.
198
 
Of course, Congress may not compel the President to appoint or nominate 
someone. The question, though, is what counts as “compulsion.” So, statutes 
that state that the President “shall nominate X” might seem unconstitutional, 
but I would interpret this statute as a conditional offer rather than a coercive 
command. It is uncontroversial that Congress may put the President to some 
such choices. For example, Volokh writes: 
With a little more planning, Congress might be able to make the office 
unattractive to people without certain qualifications. For instance, it 
might specify that the director of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (“FEMA”) will receive a salary of $10 per year unless she has five 
years of emergency management experience, in which case the director’s 
salary is $200,000 per year.
199
 
But a President could just as easily object to a provision like this on the ground 
that it still, effectively, forces him or her to appoint someone with five years of 
experience—just as if it were a traditional statutory qualification. 
The real question is, at what point does a qualification become so coercive 
that it interferes with the President’s appointment and nomination powers? Vo-
lokh argues that Congress can legitimately use its authority over “powers, duties, 
and salary” to force the President’s hand.
200
 I would go even further. Because 
Congress may use its authority to “establish [the office] by Law,” it may also use 
this authority to force the President’s hand. The question turns on whether an 
office is a privilege or a right, and thus whether a qualification is a caveat or an 
 
197. Cf. Charles L. Black, Jr., Some Thoughts on the Veto, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 88-89 
(1976) (“[I asked] myself, ‘To what state could Congress, without violating the Constitution, 
reduce the President?’ I arrived at a picture of a man living in a modest apartment, with per-
haps one secretary to answer mail; that is where one appropriation bill could put him, at the 
beginning of a new term. I saw this man as negotiating closely with the Senate, and from a 
position of weakness, on every appointment, and as conducting diplomatic relations with 
those countries where Congress would pay for an embassy. But he was still vetoing bills.”). 
198. Of course, the Constitution elsewhere provides that “no religious Test shall ever be required 
as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
199. Volokh, supra note 178, at 765. 
200. Id. 
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unconstitutional condition. This Note’s analysis in Part I demonstrates that qual-




Readers might object that this interpretation would allow Congress to re-
duce the President to impotence. Perhaps so, but bicameralism and presentment 
give the President the last word on these statutes. Doubtless, he or she would 
veto any truly radical bills. Congress would also likely put its popular legitimacy 
at risk if it attempted to hamstring the administration of the laws or make the 
President its lackey, and the House faces the constant threat of biennial election. 
What’s more, such theoretically endless power is not outside the norm. For ex-
ample, Congress could use its authority under the Appropriations Clause to 
shutter the government and reduce the President to total destitution. And in any 
event, the President’s unity gives him or her a structural advantage in inter-
branch disputes that makes additional constitutional protections seem unneces-
sary.
202
 Qualifications clauses pose no serious threat to the Republic, and the 
Constitution leaves it to Congress to impose them as it sees fit. 
2. Removal and Control 
For-cause removal provisions present a different question than qualifications 
clauses. As a general matter, these provisions claim that the President may only 
remove the officer for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”
203
 
Given the pro-Congress defense of qualifications clauses that this Note ad-
vances, it might seem implausible to argue that Congress may not impose for-
cause removal restrictions. As with qualifications clauses, Congress writes these 
provisions into the statute itself. What’s more, it could be argued that the same 
unconstitutional-conditions-style reasoning supports the constitutionality of 
 
201. This analysis also clarifies President Arthur’s objection. See supra text accompanying notes 
185-188. Although Congress cannot impose a “duty of nominating or appointing to office any 
particular individual,” see CORWIN, supra note 107, at 364, such congressional statutes should 
not be construed as compulsory. President Arthur seems to recognize the force of this line of 
argument. His veto message claims that the provision is either “an encroachment by the legis-
lative branch” or “unnecessary and ineffective.” Id. 
202. Cf. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2605 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“In any con-
troversy between the political branches over a separation-of-powers question, staking out a 
position and defending it over time is far easier for the Executive Branch than for the Legisla-
tive Branch.”). 
203. Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Inde-
pendent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1144-45 (2000) (quoting Act of Feb. 4, 1887, 
ch. 104, § 11, 24 Stat. 369, 383). 
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these provisions. If Congress does not owe the President a single office, the ob-
jection would go, then it may condition an office on a good-cause removal pro-
vision. Indeed, Justice Brandeis used qualifications as a counterpoint to Chief 
Justice Taft’s opinion in Myers v. United States.
204
 
Nevertheless, for-cause removal provisions are unconstitutional. Instead of 
imposing ex ante qualifications on the office itself, these for-cause provisions at-
tempt to limit the President’s ex post control over officers. These restrictions ex-
tend beyond the appointments process into the execution of the laws—the Pres-
ident’s core power.
205
 Drawing on the literature favoring the unitary executive, I 
shall argue that text, theory, and doctrine all support my position—even in light 
of my defense of qualifications. 
Beginning with the text, Article II states: “The executive Power shall be 
vested in a President of the United States.”
206
 Likewise, the Take Care Clause 
requires that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted.”
207
 Through the Vesting Clause and the Take Care Clause, then, the Con-
stitution establishes a President “who alone is accountable for executing federal 
law and who has the authority to control its administration.”
208
 As Saikrishna 
Prakash explains, the Constitution gives the President control over law execution 
in two ways: 
First, the president may use his executive power to execute the laws him-
self. When a statute requires an executive action to be taken or an execu-
 
204. See supra note 180. 
205. See Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 713 
(explaining that the Constitution vests only the President with the responsibility to control 
law execution, and that he or she must have the authority to execute the laws, or to direct 
subordinates to do so). 
206. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
207. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5; see also Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take 
Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1835 (2016) (discussing this Clause and the various Supreme 
Court doctrines interpreting it). 
208. Prakash, supra note 87, at 991; see also Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 178 (detailing the argu-
ments for the unitary executive theory through textual and historical lenses); Steven G. Cal-
abresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1165-68 (1992) (describing various formulations of the unitary executive 
theory and reviewing the case law that supports each theory); Elena Kagan, Presidential Ad-
ministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2325-26 (2001) (describing the views of unitary executiv-
ists); Prakash, supra note 205 (discussing the textual and historical foundations for a “chief 
executive” theory). For a response to these arguments, see Sunstein & Lessig, supra note 71, at 
4, which argues: “Any faithful reader of history must conclude that the unitary executive, con-
ceived in the foregoing way, is just myth”; and sources cited infra note 210. 
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tive decision to be made, the president may act or make the choice be-
cause the Constitution establishes that only he enjoys the executive 
power. Second, the president may use his exclusive grant of executive 
power to direct the law execution of officers. In lieu of executing the law 




Put simply, the Constitution authorizes the President to execute the law. Con-
gress may draft those laws in a way that specifies with exactitude the substantive 
content of the law itself, but all of the execution of these laws remains the ulti-
mate responsibility of the President. Even if a statute purports to vest a duty in 




Under this theory, this Note’s distinction between qualifications and for-
cause removal provisions makes good sense. Congress may ex ante define the 
minutiae (if it chooses) of substantive federal law, but it must leave the President 
to execute those laws. Likewise, Congress may ex ante define with exacting spec-
ificity the officer’s qualifications, but it must leave to the President the capacity 
to control the officer when she takes the job. What’s more, unlike qualifications, 
these for-cause removal provisions do not simply give Congress power over the 
 
209. Prakash, supra note 205, at 713. 
210. Prakash, supra note 87, at 992. Of course, this approach is not universally advanced, and 
there’s internecine disagreement among unitary executivists. See, e.g., Neomi Rao, Removal: 
Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1205 (2014) (arguing that re-
moval is necessary and sufficient to ensuring presidential control). And obviously not every-
one takes this unitary-executivist approach. Some defend Congress’s broad authority to struc-
ture the executive branch. See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency 
Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533, 534-46 (1989) (acknowledging the need for presi-
dential management while demonstrating Congress’s power to “create[e] and confin[e] exec-
utive coordinating powers”); A. Michael Froomkin, Note, In Defense of Administrative Agency 
Autonomy, 96 YALE L.J. 787, 789 (1987) (arguing that the Constitution “permits Congress to 
create executive agencies with substantial autonomy”). Still others chart a middle way. See, 
e.g., AMAR, supra note 6, at 193-94 (arguing that Congress cannot limit the President’s power 
to “unilaterally remove a high-level executive-branch appointee gone sour” but Congress 
“might properly vest authority over truly technical issues of fact in experts immune from pres-
idential reversal or reprisal”); Kagan, supra note 208, at 2326 (declining to “espouse the uni-
tarian position” but claiming to be “highly sympathetic to the view that the President should 
have broad control over administrative activity”). The Court’s doctrine has tended to tack be-
tween the extremes. Compare Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (opinion of Taft, C.J.) 
(defending a broad version of the removal power), with Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 
295 U.S. 602 (1935) (allowing Congress to include for-cause removal provisions for some 
quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative positions). 
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President. Rather than transferring power from the President to Congress, in-
dependent agencies transfer power from the President to the independent 
agency. Congress may not constitutionally do so. 
Finally, my distinction between qualifications clauses and for-cause removal 
provisions both justifies and cabins the Court’s current doctrinal trend.
211
 In Free 
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, for example, the 
Court held that “multilevel [for-cause removal] protection[s]” violated “Article 
II’s vesting of the executive power in the President.”
212
 The Court has indicated 
an appetite to again strike down these for-cause removal provisions, and com-
mentators have suggested that this decision reflects an expansive view of execu-
tive power.
213
 The CFPB’s novel structure—a single director with for-cause re-
moval protections—could also give the Court another opportunity to embrace 
Free Enterprise’s unitary-executivist jurisprudence. In PHH Corp. v. CFPB, for 
example, the en banc D.C. Circuit upheld against constitutional challenge the 
for-cause removal protection for the single director of the CFPB.
214
 Although 
PHH declined to petition for certiorari,
215
 similar litigation is ongoing.
216
 
Read for all it’s worth, though, the reasoning of Free Enterprise could extend 
well beyond for-cause removal protections. Recent scholarship argues that many 
other factors can create agency independence.
217
 Kirti Datla and Richard Revesz 
discuss a “broad set of indicia of independence: removal protection, specified 
tenure, multimember structure, partisan balance requirements, litigation au-
thority, budget and congressional communication authority, and adjudication 
authority.”
218
 If these structural features insulate agencies from presidential con-
trol, then an aggressive reading of Free Enterprise might require the Court to craft 
 
211. See Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 126 YALE 
L.J. 346, 357-60 (2016) (discussing the trend in removal jurisprudence). 
212. 561 U.S. 477, 486-87 (2010). 
213. See, e.g., Huq & Michaels, supra note 211, at 364 (“Whether Free Enterprise Fund’s new rule will 
be extended remains to be seen.”); Richard H. Pildes, Free Enterprise Fund, Boundary-En-
forcing Decisions, and the Unitary Executive Branch Theory of Government Administration, 6 DUKE 
J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1-2 (2010); Neomi Rao, A Modest Proposal: Abolishing Agency In-
dependence in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2550 (2011). 
214. 881 F.3d 75, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
215. See Hayashi, supra note 15. 
216. See Mishkin, supra note 15. 
217. Datla & Revesz, supra note 17; Vermeule, supra note 17, at 1163. 
218. Datla & Revesz, supra note 17, at 772. 
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rules to limit Congress’s ability to use them. Commentators have already sug-




Nevertheless, this Note’s distinction between congressional creation of offices 
and presidential control of officers presents a limiting principle: for-cause re-
moval provisions interfere with the President’s control, but qualifications clauses 
fall within Congress’s power of office creation. Indeed, Free Enterprise itself seems 
to adopt this distinction: “Congress has plenary control over the salary, duties, 
and even existence of executive offices. Only Presidential oversight can counter 
its influence.”
220
 This Note’s analysis presents extensive historical and textual 
support for this balance of power between the President and Congress. 
B. Temporary Appointments 
In NLRB v. SW General, Justice Thomas suggested that the FVRA raised 
“grave constitutional concerns.”
221
  This complicated vacancies act allows the 
President to “direct certain officials to temporarily carry out the duties of a vacant 
[office requiring Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation] in an acting 
capacity, without Senate confirmation.”
222
 The FVRA has antecedents in statutes 
passed by the First and Second Congresses,
223
 but it raises a broader question: 
when, if at all, may the President make temporary appointments that do not sat-




219. See Krotoszynski et al., supra note 184. 
220. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 500 (2010). 
221. NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 946 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
222. SW Gen., 137 S. Ct. at 929 (majority opinion); see Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 3345 (2018); see also Joshua L. Stayn, Note, Vacant Reform: Why the Federal Vacancies Reform 
Act of 1998 Is Unconstitutional, 50 DUKE L.J. 1511, 1522-25 (2001) (describing how the Federal 
Vacancies Reform Act functions). 
223. See, e.g., Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 37, § 8, 1 Stat. 279, 281; Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 7, 1 Stat. 
65; Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 49, 50. 
224. The best interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause is well beyond the scope of this 
Note. For a sampling of the literature, see Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the 
Recess Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1487 (2005); Michael A. Carrier, Note, When Is 
the Senate in Recess for Purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2204 
(1994); and Stuart J. Chanen, Comment, Constitutional Restrictions on the President’s Power to 
Make Recess Appointments, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 191 (1984). The Court’s decision in NLRB v. Noel 
Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014), however, settled many of these controversies—though the 
decision’s narrow majority suggests that the doctrine might be subject to change. This Note 
remains agnostic about the correct interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause, but my 
argument interacts with the Clause in a few ways. First, the Recess Appointments Clause sets 
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The Appointments Clause does in fact limit the President’s capacity to make 
these temporary appointments. Building on Justice Thomas’s critique in SW 
General, this Section sketches the limits on temporary appointments—even tem-
porary appointments with statutory approval. This Section argues: (1) the Pres-
ident lacks the constitutional authority to make temporary domestic appoint-
ments without a statutory provision; and (2) Congress has the power to give the 
President temporary appointment power because of both (i) the Inferior Officers 
Appointments Clause and (ii) the authority to “establish[] by Law” the “Of-
fice[s] of the United States.” Nevertheless, I articulate a limit on Congress’s au-
thority to allow for temporary offices: Congress may not promulgate a statute 
that allows an acting officer to serve longer than she otherwise could under the 
Recess Appointments Clause. Such a statute would mark an impermissible “end-
run around the Appointments Clause.”
225
 
1. Inherent Power 
Although commentators have suggested that the President has some author-
ity to direct officers to temporarily perform the functions of vacant offices with-
out statutory authority, I will demonstrate that the Constitution clearly forbids 
this practice. A number of legal scholars have argued that the President has au-
thority to make acting appointments by virtue of Article II. The Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC), for example, has strongly suggested that the President has the 
residual authority to make acting appointments without legislative authoriza-
tion.
226
 OLC argues that this power flows from the Take Care Clause’s instruc-
tion that the President “shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”
227
 
Likewise, Edward Corwin argued that, even though “a situation of this nature is 
[usually] provided for in advance by a statute . . . , in lack of such a provision, 
 
the constitutional minimum for permissible vacancies; Congress may augment the President’s 
authority with statutory mechanisms that allow temporary appointments. Second, the Recess 
Appointments Clause also imposes a constitutional limit—call it the “anticircumvention” 
rule—that prevents Congress from completely abdicating its responsibilities under the Ap-
pointments Clause. If a congressional statute allows temporary officers to serve for a longer 
term than the Recess Appointments Clause would otherwise allow, then it is an impermissible 
end-run around the Appointments Clause. Put simply, this Note claims that the Recess Ap-
pointments Clause serves as both a “floor” and a “ceiling” that limits congressional discretion 
over temporary appointments, but the Note makes no claims about what those limits are. 
225. SW Gen., 137 S. Ct. at 949 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
226. See The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President & Cong., 20 Op. O.L.C. 
124, 161 (1996). 
227. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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Nevertheless, the Constitution’s text clearly forbids the President from mak-
ing temporary appointments without prior congressional authorization.
229
 Most 
importantly, Part I of this Note shows that the Constitution strictly cabins exec-
utive-branch discretion with regard to “Officers of the United States.” That ar-
gument refers to office creation, but it also supports the structural inference that 
the President should not be granted plenary, unenumerated power respecting 
the creation and deployment of the government’s officers. In addition, the Ap-
pointments Clause’s text requires that the President “shall nominate, and by and 
with the consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . all other Officers.”
230
 Again, the 
Constitution’s use of “shall” is usually mandatory,
231
 and this provision does not 
admit of exceptions (“all other Officers”). The Constitution’s text thus assumes 
that the President will seek the Senate’s approval. An inherent temporary-ap-
pointments power would circumvent this commitment. 
The two exceptions to this advice-and-consent baseline prove the rule. First, 
the Inferior Officers Appointments Clause allows that Congress “may by Law 
vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the Presi-
dent alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Head of Departments.”
232
 With this 
Clause, the Constitution introduces a degree of flexibility into the appointments 
process.
233
 But it gives this flexibility to Congress: they “may” vest the appoint-
ment “by Law” if “they think proper.” Congress must exercise its own discretion 
before the President may make use of a discretionary appointments mechanism. 
Second, the Recess Appointments Clause gives the President direct flexibility. 
The Clause recognizes that the President might need officers even when the Sen-
ate cannot meet, but it provides a specific mechanism for filling “[v]acancies that 
 
228. CORWIN, supra note 107, at 79. Nonetheless, Lois Reznick’s student comment argues persua-
sively to the contrary. See Lois Reznick, Comment, Temporary Appointment Power of the Presi-
dent, 41 U. CHI. L. REV.146, 151 n.29 (1973) (challenging Corwin’s reading of the Opinions of 
the Attorney General on which he bases the conclusion). 
229. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 187 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (“[T]he President 
may neither select a principal officer without the Senate’s concurrence, nor fill any office with-
out Congress’s authorization.”); Reznick, supra note 228, at 150-51. 
230. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
231. See supra note 58. 
232. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
233. See, e.g., Weiss, 510 U.S. at 186-87 (Souter, J., concurring) (“A degree of flexibility was thought 
appropriate in providing for the appointment of officers who, by definition, would have only 
inferior governmental authority.” (citing 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 8, at 627)). 
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may happen during the Recess of the Senate.”
234
 These specific exceptions to the 
advice-and-consent baseline confirm that the Constitution excludes a general 
power to make temporary appointments that are neither authorized by statute 
nor pursuant to the Recess Appointments Clause.
235
 
2. Vacancies Acts 
Congress has long passed statutes that “allow some breathing room in the 
constitutional system for appointing officers to vacant positions.”
236
 These va-
cancies acts supplement the Recess Appointments Clause (the Constitution’s 
“floor”) with statutory mechanisms for temporary appointments. Still, these 
statutes raise some constitutional problems. This Section (1) discusses the his-
tory and basic mechanisms of vacancies acts; (2) lays out the constitutional prob-
lems that these acts raise; and (3) articulates two theories of the Appointments 
Clause that both justify and limit these statutes. Because congressional statutes 
should be presumed to be constitutional, a vacancies act should be construed to 




234. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
235. And even if the constitutional question were doubtful, Congress has spoken directly to the 
issue in the FVRA. See 5 U.S.C. § 3347 (2018) (specifying that the FVRA is the “exclusive 
means” for temporary appointments). Therefore, any attempt to circumvent the FVRA would 
be incompatible with the expressed will of Congress. The Youngstown framework places such 
actions in an especially suspect “Category III.” See Reznick, supra note 228, at 153-54. 
236. Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 139 F.3d 203, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1998), 
superseded by statute, Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 151, 112 Stat. 
2681, 2681-611 to -616, as recognized in SW Gen., Inc. v. NLRB, 796 F.3d 67, 70-71 (D.C. Cir. 
2015). See generally VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44997, THE VACANCIES 
ACT: A LEGAL OVERVIEW (Oct. 30, 2017), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44997.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/S4YR-MFXF] (describing the FVRA’s general authorization of temporary-govern-
ment-employee performance of the nondelegable functions and duties of a vacant advice-and-
consent executive-agency position); MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-892, 
THE NEW VACANCIES ACT: CONGRESS ACTS TO PROTECT THE SENATE’S CONFIRMATION PRE-
ROGATIVE (Nov. 2, 1998), http://www.everycrsreport.com/files/19981102_98 
-892_e35b004e5166781e938da36cf87598c023b03614.pdf [https://perma.cc/BY88-44CR] 
(documenting the legislative history of the FVRA); Thomas A. Berry, S.W. General: The 
Court Reins in Unilateral Appointments, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 151 (analyzing the FVRA 
through the lens of NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929). 
237. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 
2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181, 184-89 (discussing the canon of constitutional avoidance). 
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a. The History of the Vacancies Acts 
The First Congress established such statutory backstops within each depart-
ment’s organic statutes. Briefly discussing the history of these statutes will be 
useful for two reasons. First, early constitutional practice is powerful evidence of 
the Constitution’s original public meaning.
238
 Because Congress passed these 
statutes so soon after the Constitution’s ratification, Congress today should be 
presumed to have similar powers. Second, the early history provides helpful ex-
amples of the types of vacancies acts that Congress creates today: namely, what 
I will call “automatic-promotion” provisions and “presidential-authorization” 
provisions. 
Consider the 1789 Act that established the Treasury Department. After cre-
ating the positions of “Treasurer” and “Assistant Treasurer,” the statute stated 
that the Assistant “shall, during the vacancy [of the Treasurer], have the charge 
and custody of the records.”
239
 The Act creating the Departments of Foreign Af-
fairs and of War included similar language.
240
 In 1792, though, Congress altered 
and expanded these provisions for temporary officers. Under this new statute, 
the incapacitation of the “Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, or of the 
Secretary of the War” would allow the President “to authorize any person or per-
sons at his discretion to perform the duties of the said respective offices until a 




The 1792 amendment made three relevant alterations to the 1789 provisions. 
First, it broadened who qualified for the temporary office from the “inferior of-
ficer” within the department to “any person.” Second, it expanded what these 
officers were responsible for, shifting their responsibilities from “charge and cus-
tody” of records to “perform[ing] the duties” of the office. Third, it altered how 
the temporary-office provisions were triggered (i.e., from an automatic-promo-
tion provision to a presidential-authorization provision). Three years later, Con-
gress again amended the statute to limit temporary appointees to six months in 
the position.
242
  Congress then enacted the first generalized vacancies act in 
 
238. See supra notes 3-4; see also Bamzai, supra note 33, at 1506 (“The Supreme Court often tests 
the validity of present-day constitutional doctrine and practice by referring to the actions of 
the First Congress.”). 
239. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 7, 1 Stat. 65, 67. 
240. See Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, § 2, 1 Stat. 28, 29; Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 49, 50. 
241. See May 8, 1792, ch. 37, § 8, 1 Stat. 279, 281. 
242. Act of Feb. 13, 1795, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 415; see also Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Office of Thrift 
Supervision, 139 F.3d 203, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discussing the history of vacancies acts). 








Passed in 1998, the FVRA functions much like the 1789 and 1792 temporary-
appointment statutes. The FVRA creates a transsubstantive statutory default 
rule that governs temporary appointments across the executive branch. Indeed, 
it claims to be the “exclusive means” for temporary appointment to offices that 
require the Senate’s advice and consent,
245
 although conflicts sometimes arise 
when conflicting statutes appear to say otherwise.
246
 
The FVRA allows temporary officers to take on their new jobs in two ways: 
(1) with automatic-promotion provisions and (2) with presidential-authoriza-
tion provisions. First, the statute provides that, if a qualifying office becomes 
vacant, then the “first assistant . . . shall perform the functions and duties of the 
office temporarily.”
247
 Second, despite the first assistant’s elevation by operation 
of law, the President may “direct” certain other persons to temporarily perform 
the duties.
248
 This distinction—between automatic promotion (which has its an-
tecedent in the 1789 statute) and presidential direction (which has its antecedent 
in the 1792 statute)—matters for purposes of the Appointments Clause. 
b. Constitutional Concerns 
In NLRB v. SW General, Justice Thomas’s solo concurrence argued that the 
FVRA raises “grave constitutional concern.”
249
 In that case, the President had di-
rected a senior employee in the NLRB to perform the functions of the General 
 
243. See July 23, 1868, ch. 227, 15 Stat. 168. 
244. See generally Doolin, 139 F.3d at 209-12 (discussing the history of the Vacancies Act). 
245. 5 U.S.C. § 3347 (2018); see also id. § 3347(a)(1)-(2) (exempting cases when other statutes “ex-
pressly” allow a temporary appointment or when the President appoints someone “pursuant 
to” the Recess Appointments Clause). 
246. For example, the recent controversy over Richard Cordray’s successor as Director of the CFPB 
involved a (perceived) conflict between the CFPB’s organic statute and the FVRA. See Stacy 
Cowley, Battle for Control of Consumer Agency Heads to Court, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2017), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/26/business/trump-cfpb-consumer-agency.html 
[https://perma.cc/TLD5-5QMB]; Memorandum from Steven A. Engel, Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Office of Legal Counsel, to Donald F. McGahn II, Counsel to the President (Nov. 25, 2017), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/attachments/2017/11/25/cfpb_acting
_director_olc_op_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SF7-E47W] (discussing how the Acting Direc-
tor for the CFPB should be determined). 
247. 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
248. Id. § 3345(a)(2)-(3). 
249. 137 S. Ct. 929, 946 (Thomas, J., concurring). 




  The Court invalidated this temporary appointment on statutory 
grounds,
251
 but Justice Thomas concurred to raise a constitutional issue. Put 
simply, he argued that the NLRB’s General Counsel was a “principal officer” un-
der the Court’s jurisprudence;
252
 that the FVRA could, in some instances, allow 
the President to appoint principal officers without the advice and consent of the 
Senate; and that, therefore, the FVRA might partially violate the Appointments 
Clause. “That the Senate voluntarily relinquished its advice-and-consent power 
in the FVRA,” Justice Thomas claimed, “does not make this end-run around the 
Appointments Clause constitutional.”
253
 Worse still, Justice Thomas might have 
added, the automatic-promotion provisions could allow the “first assistant” to 
serve as a principal officer even without the President’s say-so.
254
 
This Note offers two responses to Justice Thomas’s critique: (1) the FVRA 
allows the President, by virtue of the Inferior Officers Appointments Clause, to 
appoint people to temporary, inferior offices distinct from the original, perma-
nent office; and (2) Congress’s authority to “establish [offices] by Law” allows it 
to vest duties in certain offices contingent on another office becoming vacant. 
Each theory explains the constitutionality of certain provisions of the FVRA. Be-
cause Congress’s statutory handiwork should be upheld if either theory can sus-
tain its constitutionality, these two theories should together render the FVRA 
mostly constitutional. Put differently, if a provision can be sustained under either 
 
250. Id. at 937 (majority opinion). 
251. Id. at 944. 
252. Id. at 947-48 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Although the Board has power to define some of the 
general counsel’s duties, and the general counsel represents the Board in certain judicial pro-
ceedings, the statute does not give the Board the power to remove him or otherwise generally 
to control his activities.” (citations omitted)). Justice Thomas relied on the reasoning in both 
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997), and in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
See SW Gen., 137 S. Ct. at 947 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
253. SW Gen., 137 S. Ct. at 949 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
254. See 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1) (2018). Deputy Director of the CFPB, Leondra English, made a sim-
ilar argument under the CFPB’s organic statute. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief at 4, English v. Trump, 279 F. Supp. 3d 307 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 1:17-cv-02534), 2017 
WL 5727846 (“As an additional measure of independence, Congress ensured that the Presi-
dent could not circumvent the need for Senate confirmation by naming a temporary replace-
ment for a Director who leaves before the expiration of his or her term. Instead, Congress 
provided that the Bureau’s Deputy Director, who is ‘appointed by the Director,’ shall ‘serve as 
acting Director in the absence or unavailability of the Director.’”). The district court refused 
to grant a preliminary injunction, and the case was appealed to the D.C. Circuit. It has since 
been dismissed, following English’s resignation from the CFPB. See Donna Borak, CFPB Of-
ficial Who Challenged Mulvaney for Top Job is Stepping Down, CNN (July 6, 2018, 5:38 PM ET), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/06/politics/cfpb-deputy-leandra-english-resigns/index
.html [https://perma.cc/JCK9-PNPK]. 
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theory, then the FVRA survives. But even together, I will argue, certain applica-
tions of the FVRA will remain unconstitutional. The rest of this Section ad-
dresses each theory in turn. 
c. Theories of Constitutionality 
i. Appointment to Temporary Inferior Offices 
The FVRA could be construed to “establish by Law” a parallel set of tempo-
rary offices. Every office to which the FVRA applies, the argument goes, has a 
related, distinct, and temporary office that the President may appoint someone 
to fill. The National Labor Relations Act, for instance, creates the office of the 
“General Counsel for the NLRB,” but the FVRA creates the distinct office of “Act-
ing General Counsel for the NLRB.” Of course, Congress did not write the FVRA 
in this way. Instead, the FVRA states that the President may direct qualifying 
officials “to perform the functions and duties of the vacant office temporarily in 
an acting capacity.”
255
 But Congress should not have to use magic words to es-
tablish an office. If the special-and-temporary-office theory salvages the FVRA 
without working “gruesome surgery” on the text,
256




But the special-and-temporary-office theory requires a second argument. 
The Inferior Officers Appointments Clause allows Congress to give the “Presi-
dent alone” the authority to appoint only “inferior Officers.” If the original office 
is a principal office, then wouldn’t the temporary one be so too? Perhaps not. 
Because such an acting officer would only have special and temporary powers, 
the position might be an inferior one.
258
 President George W. Bush’s OLC relied 
on this reasoning to allow the appointment of an Acting Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget.
259
 Indeed, if the special and temporary nature of the 
acting-officer position were not sufficient to render it inferior, then the Consti-
tution would “void any and every delegation of power to an inferior to perform 
 
255. 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(2). 
256. See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2097 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
257. See generally Eric S. Fish, Constitutional Avoidance as Interpretation and as Remedy, 114 MICH. L. 
REV. 1275 (2016) (discussing the canon of constitutional avoidance); Hasen, supra note 237, at 
184-89 (same). 
258. See United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898). 
259. Designation of Acting Dir. of the Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 27 Op. O.L.C. 121, 123 (2003) 
(“Although the position of Director is a principal office, we believe that an Acting Director is 
only an inferior officer.”). 
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under any circumstances or exigency the duties of a superior officer, and the dis-
charge of administrative duties would be seriously hindered.”
260
 And these sorts 
of delegations, it should be reiterated, have their antecedents in statutes passed 
by the First and Second Congresses.
261
 Such longstanding historical practice 
should be declared unconstitutional only with thoroughly convincing evidence. 
Justice Thomas, however, anticipated and addressed this line of reasoning. 
The official in SW General was “appointed ‘temporarily’ to serve as acting general 
counsel,” but Justice Thomas did not “think the structural protections of the Ap-
pointments Clause c[ould] be avoided based on such trivial distinctions.”
262
 
Otherwise, the Senate (aided and abetted by the House) could surrender its ad-
vice-and-consent responsibilities to the President. After all, Justice Thomas 
noted, the official did end up serving for over three years in a position that Con-
gress limited to a four-year term.
263
 
The difficult issue, then, is the distinction between “special and temporary” 
and “effectively permanent.” A structural analogy to the Recess Appointments 
Clause might resolve the question. The FVRA exists to ensure the continuity of 
government while the President and Senate select, vet, and confirm a suitable 
candidate for office. By analogy, the Recess Appointments Clause “ensure[s] the 
continued functioning of the Federal Government when the Senate is away.”
264
 
Because the Recess Appointments Clause functions as the constitutional back-
stop, and because Congress should not be allowed to make an “end-run around 
the Appointments Clause,”
265
 the FVRA should not allow temporary appointees 
to serve for longer terms than the Recess Appointments Clause would permit. 
That Clause states that the recess appointment “shall expire at the End of their 
next session.”
266
 In Noel Canning, the Court interpreted the Clause to ensure that 
the “President and the Senate always have at least a full session to go through 
the nomination and confirmation process.”
267
 The Court suggested that appoint-
 
260. Eaton, 169 U.S. at 343; see also Officers of the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Appointments 
Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 101 n.11 (2007) (citing Eaton). 
261. See supra text accompanying notes 239-244. 
262. NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 946 n.1 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
263. Id. 
264. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2561 (2014). 
265. SW Gen., 137 S. Ct. at 949 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
266. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
267. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2565. Justice Scalia disagreed, arguing that the Recess Appoint-
ments Clause only ensures that the President has the help of subordinates until the Senate has 
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ments as long as “1½; or almost 2 years” would not raise a constitutional prob-
lem.
268
 By contrast, Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the Clause “would permit 
the appointee to serve for about a year.”
269
 
Neither of the time limits advanced in Noel Canning supports the FVRA’s 
generous allowances. As a baseline, the statute allows the acting officer to serve 
“for no longer than 210 days.”
270
 But if a nomination is submitted to the Senate, 
then the acting officer can continue to serve “for the period that the nomination 
is pending,” and for 210 more days if the nomination is “rejected by the Senate, 
withdrawn, or returned to the President by the Senate.”
271
 And the statute allows 
this process to repeat for a second nomination.
272
 In total, then, the statute allows 
the person to serve for up to 210 days until a nomination, then during the pen-
dency of the first nomination, then for 210 days longer, then during the second 
pending nomination, and then for another 210 days. 
Worse still, the FVRA’s time limits go well beyond what Congress has his-
torically allowed. Congress’s 1792 statute prohibited the appointee from serving 
“for a longer term than six months.”
273
 The Vacancy Act of 1868 limited the ap-
pointee to ten days, which became thirty days in 1891, and then 120 days in 
1988.
274
 None of these previous laws allowed the clock to restart if the President’s 
nominee failed.
275
 So, the 1998 amendments not only extended the time limit 
longer than it had ever been (to 210 days), but also allowed the clock to restart 
twice. Put simply, these unprecedented and overly generous time limits consti-
tute an “end-run around the Appointments Clause.”
276
 In an appropriate case, 




an “opportunity to act on the subject.” Id. at 2597 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quot-
ing 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1551, at 
410 (Boston, Hillard, Gray & Co. 1833)). 
268. Id. at 2565 (majority opinion). 
269. Id. 
270. 5 U.S.C. § 3346(a)(1) (2018). 
271. Id. § 3346(a)(2), (b)(1). 
272. Id. § 3346(b)(2). 
273. Act of Feb. 13, 1795, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 415. 
274. Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank, F.S.B., v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 139 F.3d 203, 210-11 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (recounting this history). 
275. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 3345 (1994). 
276. NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 949 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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ii. Contingent Duties 
The automatic-promotion mechanism raises different constitutional prob-
lems. Because the “first assistant” inherits the principal officer’s duties by oper-
ation of law, the Inferior Officers Appointments Clause cannot justify the ap-
pointment. Instead, the temporary duties must be construed as contingent 
powers appended to the original office.
277
 Put another way, the first assistant’s 
vested duties might include responsibilities X and Y, but if a vacancy arises, he 
or she also has responsibility Z. Generally, Congress has the capacity to make the 
effect of a law contingent on facts on the ground or on some other government 
official’s determination. 
But the constitutionality of such a statute turns in part on whether the first 
office is appointed as an inferior officer or as a principal officer. Begin with inferior 
officers. Suppose that the assistant who will be automatically promoted to a prin-
cipal office was not confirmed by the Senate—or, with English in the CFPB case, 
was unilaterally appointed by the Director.
278
 In the case of an inferior officer, 
then, the automatic-promotion provision raises graver concerns that the statute 
marks an end-run around the Appointments Clause. Because the promotion oc-
curs by operation of law, neither the President nor the Senate is directly involved 
in the new appointment—even though the Constitution requires this involve-
ment for all principal officers.
279
 
Nevertheless, the analysis in the last Section can resolve this tension. Just as 
with the temporary appointees, United States v. Eaton’s allowance for “special and 
temporary” duties suggests that even an inferior officer can still take on the prin-
cipal’s duties—at least for a time.
280
 Therefore, these automatic-promotion pro-
visions should be constitutional when an inferior officer assumes the duties of a 
principal officer if: (1) the inferior officer’s original appointment satisfies the Ap-
pointments Clause (i.e., she was lawfully appointed by the President, head of 
 
277. OLC has in fact relied on this theory before: “[F]or anyone who is already an ‘Officer of the 
United States’ and who was appointed after the enactment of the Vacancies Reform 
Act, . . . any duties arising under the Vacancies Reform Act can be regarded as part and parcel 
of the office to which he was appointed.” Designation of Acting Dir. of the Office of Mgmt. & 
Budget, 27 Op. O.L.C. 121, 122 n.3 (2003). 
278. See English v. Trump, 279 F. Supp. 3d 307, 319 (2018) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(5)(B) 
(2018)). 
279. This lack of involvement might be especially problematic when, as in the CFPB’s case, the 
Director is insulated from presidential control already. See, e.g., id. at 328 (“Under English’s 
interpretation, however, Cordray could have named anyone the CFPB’s Deputy Director, and 
the President would be virtually powerless to replace that person upon ascension to acting 
Director—no matter how unqualified that person might be.”). 
280. See 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898). 
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the department, or a court of law) and (2) the contingent duties are truly “special 
and temporary.”
 
So long as both of these conditions are satisfied, promotion by 
operation of law should be perfectly constitutional. 
Now consider principal officers. Suppose that an officer who has already 
been confirmed by the Senate takes on new responsibilities. In that case, the con-
tingent duties need not be “special and temporary” at all. When the Senate con-
firmed the first officer, it should be presumed to have known that the principal 
officer stood to inherit the responsibilities of vacant offices. Put differently, the 
contingent duties were part and parcel with the original office. Therefore, the 
Appointments Clause likely places no limits on principal officers inheriting the 
duties of other principal offices.
281
 
C. Officers and Employees 
The Appointments Clause only applies to “Officers of the United States”—
not to mere “employees.” This distinction has a long history that dates back at 
least to an 1823 circuit court opinion penned by Chief Justice Marshall.
282
 Since 
1823, however, the Court has addressed the distinction only infrequently. The 
rare decisions that consider the question often technically deal with questions of 
statutory interpretation,
283
 and modern decisions have been especially sparse. 
Buckley v. Valeo, for instance, held that officers were those who exercise “signifi-
cant authority,” while employees were “lesser functionaries subordinate to offic-
ers.”
284
 More recently, the Court applied the Clause to special trial judges in the 
 
281. This line of argument raises a thorny question for Mulvaney’s ongoing tenure at the head of 
the CFPB. Mulvaney was appointed to Acting Director under the FVRA’s temporary-appoint-
ment provisions—not the automatic-promotion provisions. Therefore, one way to think about 
Mulvaney’s job at the CFPB is as an additional temporary office along with his office as Direc-
tor of OMB. If so, Mulvaney can only hold the second office so long as the duties remain 
special and temporary. But another way of thinking about his CFPB-based duties is that the 
President triggered the contingent duties when he “direct[ed]” Mulvaney to take the job. If 
so, then the duties of Acting Director were part and parcel with the office the Senate has al-
ready allowed him to hold—i.e., the Director of OMB. This Note’s discussion could cut either 
way. On the one hand, Congress’s handiwork should be presumed to be constitutional. On 
the other hand, it strains credibility to say that the duties of Acting Director of the CFPB are 
contingent duties already included within the office of Director of OMB. 
282. See United States v. Maurice, 26 F. Cas. 1211, 1213-14 (C.C.D. Va. 1823) (No. 15,747); see also 
West, supra note 33, at 46-50 (discussing Maurice and other early case law). 
283. See, e.g., Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310 (1890); United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508 
(1878); United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385 (1867). 
284. 424 U.S. 1, 126 & n.162 (1976) (per curiam). 
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United States Tax Court in Freytag v. Commissioner.
285
 And finally, in Lucia v. 
SEC, the Court once again reaffirmed the modern line of cases—but refused to 
elaborate “any more detailed legal criteria.”
286
 
This Note’s discussion of Congress’s office-creation power attempts to pro-
vide these more detailed legal criteria. This Section argues that (1) only “dele-
gated sovereign authority”
287
—or, duties that “alter legal rights or obligations on 
behalf of the United States”
288
—can be sufficient to create “officer” status; and 
(2) to determine whether the officer exercises this “sovereign authority,” judges 
must look to both the statute that “established [the office] by Law” and the reg-
ulations, if any, that subdelegate responsibilities to that officer.
289
 
This test would also resolve several puzzles left over after the Court’s decision 
in Lucia.
290
 First, the functional version of the “significant authority” test does 
not provide an obvious reason to distinguish between de facto importance and 
de jure authority when evaluating the job’s significance. This distinction matters 
because it makes sense of the President’s traditional reliance on informal advisors 
and “czars” and because it shows how that reliance coheres with the Appoint-
ments Clause.
291
 Second, the test narrows the category of “Officers of the United 
 
285. 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991) (finding the special trial judges to be inferior officers, not employees, 
under the Buckley formulation). 
286. 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2052 (2018). 
287. Officers of the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 77 
(2007). 
288. See West, supra note 33 (proposing this test based on administrative law doctrine). 
289. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126 (defining an officer as one who exercises authority “pursuant 
to the laws of the United States”). This test draws on each of Lucia’s three opinions, but does 
not directly adopt any opinion’s analysis. This Note’s test is more formalistic than the ap-
proach the majority took. Unlike Justice Thomas’s concurrence, however, it requires more 
than just an “ongoing statutory duty,” Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2056 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(quoting NLRB v. S.W. Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 946 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring))—
rather, it requires that the duty be of a certain kind. And unlike Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, 
which requires the officer to exercise “final decisionmaking authority,” id. at 2065 (Sotomayor, 
J, dissenting), the alters-legal-rights test is triggered by a more capacious category of author-
ity. 
290. I do not attempt to defend this test at great length. Instead, I attempt to show that this test 
can resolve some of the puzzles raised by the Court’s fractured opinions in Lucia. 
291. See Examining the History and Legality of Executive Branch Czars: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 12 (2009) [hereinafter Czars Hearing] (statement of Professor 
John Harrison) (“The next point I want to make is that there is a difference between actual 
legal power between formal authority and influence and importance in the Government. 
There are a great many people in all three branches of Government who do not have any actual 
legal authority but who, nevertheless, are quite important to the process of formulating policy 
or in the judicial branch, thinking of law clerks, to the process of deciding cases.”). 
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States” as compared to the “ongoing statutory duties” test adopted by Justices 
Thomas and Gorsuch. Although this Note cannot rival the extensive historical 
research mustered by Professor Mascott and cited by the Justices, I suggest a few 
tensions that the ongoing-duties test creates. Third, I discuss how courts should 
deal with “contingent duties” when determining whether an official must be ap-
pointed according to the Appointments Clause. 
1. Advisors and Czars 
Presidents have long relied on informal advisors—today, sometimes referred 
to as “czars”
292
—to assist them with their official duties.
293
 Relying on these ad-
visors without congressional approval might seem to violate the Appointments 
Clause. On the one hand, the President might be circumventing the Constitu-
tion’s mandate that Congress has exclusive office-creating authority.
294
 If each 
office must be “established by Law,” then the President should not hire officials 
without congressional authorization.
295
  Critics often advance this line of  
 
292. See, e.g., Aaron J. Saiger, Obama’s “Czars” for Domestic Policy and the Law of the White House 
Staff, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577, 2598 (2011) (discussing whether presidential czars should be 
considered officers); Kevin Sholette, Note, The American Czars, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
219, 226-37 (2010) (discussing constitutional questions raised by czars). For an excellent his-
tory of these informal advisors, see Jay S. Bybee, Advising the President: Separation of Powers 
and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 104 YALE L.J. 51, 56-76 (1994). 
293. Professor Corwin recounts that President Theodore Roosevelt relied on volunteer commis-
sioners to “investigat[e] certain factual situations and report[] their findings to the President.” 
CORWIN, supra note 107, at 71. President Herbert Hoover followed Roosevelt’s lead in relying 
on “fact-finding commissions, most of them without statutory basis.” Id. at 71-72. For sim-
plicity, this Section discusses only presidential advisors. Similar issues should also apply to 
agency advisory committees. See generally Michael H. Cardozo, The Federal Advisory Committee 
Act in Operation, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (1981) (discussing executive advisory committee pro-
cesses); Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee Act and Good 
Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451, 458-60 (1997) (discussing the history of advisory com-
mittees as they relate to agencies and the President). 
294. Cf. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 187 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (“[N]o branch 
may aggrandize its own appointment power at the expense of another.”). 
295. Today, an overlapping set of laws impliedly authorizes nearly any informal advisor that the 
President could appoint. See, e.g., 3 U.S.C. § 105(a)(1) (2018) (“[T]he President is authorized 
to appoint and fix the pay of employees in the White House Office . . . . Employees so appointed 
shall perform such official duties as the President may prescribe.”) (emphasis added); Advisory 
Comms.—Application of the Russell Amendment (31 U.S.C. § 696), 3 Op. O.L.C. 263, 264 
(1979) (observing that the Federal Advisory Committee Act provides generalized authority to 
establish advisory committees); see also Saiger, supra note 292, at 2598-2600 (relying on the 
definition of “agency” under FOIA and the APA to justify the appointment of czars as em-
ployees, not officers). Nevertheless, these statutes do put limits on the President’s authority to 
hire these informal advisors. For example, the text of those statutes might only authorize the 
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argument, as then-Professor Bybee persuasively showed.
296
  And these argu-
ments have been revitalized recently to challenge modern Presidents’ reliance on 
informal, nonstatutory czars to advance their policy visions.
297
 
Nevertheless, the Appointments Clause should be construed to allow this 
practice. Presidents stretching back to Washington have claimed broad authority 
to rely on informal advisors.
298
 Here again, early practice is powerful evidence of 
its constitutionality.
299
 This claim to authority usually rests on the Take Care 
Clause or, depending on the purpose of the advisors, on the Recommendations 
Clause.
300
 Recently, President Obama’s White House Counsel made a similar ar-
gument.
301
 Accordingly, the best view is that czars and informal advisors should 
be excluded from the class of “officers of the United States.” 
 
President to hire employees (i.e., not officers), see 3 U.S.C. § 105(a)(1) (2018) (referring to 
employees), and so the statutory question and the constitutional question might be coexten-
sive. What’s more, a future Congress, perhaps in retaliation for perceived corruption in the 
White House, might strictly limit the President’s authority to hire staff to assist him or her. 
Perhaps the Appropriations Clause allows Congress to refuse to appropriate funds, see U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; Stith, supra note 104, at 1360-63, but this Note argues that it could 
not forbid the President from consulting them. For a recent attempt to grapple with the prob-
lem of when Congress can refuse to fund the President’s constitutional responsibilities, see 
Zachary S. Price, Funding Restrictions and Separation of Powers, 71 VAND. L. REV. 357 (2018). 
296. See Bybee, supra note 292, at 63-70. Consider one example. President Roosevelt created a 
Council of Fine Arts, directed that its “advice [be] followed” in the executive branch, and re-
quested that Congress ratify the Council. Id. at 63. Instead, Congress attempted to ban ap-
propriations to pay the salary of such a council, and members of Congress claimed that “such 
ca body should be created by the legislative body and not by the executive.” Id. at 64. 
297. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. S9497 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2009) (statement of Sen. Alexander) (ques-
tioning the use of czars and claiming that “we take seriously our responsibilities under Article 
II”); id. at S9499 (letter from Sen. Feingold); Sholette, supra note 292, at 220 (asking whether 
“presidential practice of appointing experts to influential positions within the executive 
branch without Senate confirmation violates Section II, Clause 2 . . . of the United States Con-
stitution, commonly known as the Appointments Clause”). 
298. See supra notes 117-128 and accompanying text; cf. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 
U.S. 440, 453 (1989) (“[I]t cannot have been Congress’[s] intention, for example, to require 
the filing of a charter, the presence of a controlling federal official, and detailed minutes any 
time the President seeks the views of the [NAACP] before nominating Commissioners to the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or asks the leaders of an American Legion Post 
he is visiting for the organization’s opinion on some aspect of military policy.”). 
299. See supra note 238. 
300. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 2 (Recommendations Clause); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5 
(Take Care Clause); Bybee, supra note 292, at 62 (recounting an argument advanced by Pres-
ident John Tyler). 
301. See Czars Hearing, supra note 291, at 96-99 (2009) (letter from Gregory B. Craig, White 
House Counsel, to Sen. Russell D. Feingold). 
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But the Court’s doctrine does not easily explain why these advisors should 
be excluded from the Clause’s scope. True enough, the original formulation in 
Buckley required “significant authority pursuant to the laws.”302 But the language 
of “significance” does not easily distinguish between “actual legal power” and 
practical “influence” in the administrative state—or, in other words, between de 
facto importance and de jure authority.
303
 The majority in Lucia mostly focused 
on actual legal authority, but at times it suggested that informal authority could 
influence the categorization of a government official as an officer or employee.
304
 
The test articulated in this Note, however, explains why nonstatutory duties 
and responsibilities should not trigger the Appointments Clause: they cannot be 
the exercise of “delegated sovereign authority,” and they cannot “alter legal rights 
or obligations on behalf of the United States.”
305
 White House positions with 
informal authority might be “extremely influential,”
306
 but they cannot lawfully 
bind the government or third parties. That sort of authority must be exercised 
pursuant to valid substantive law.
307
 Indeed, challenging the actions of nonstat-
utory czars is just a roundabout way of saying that the deprivation wasn’t au-
thorized by statute.
308
 Put differently, the correct interpretation of the Appoint-
ments Clause should cohere with the Constitution’s basic principle of legality. 
 
302.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1975) (per curiam) (emphasis added). 
303. See Czars Hearing, supra note 291, at 12 (statement of Professor John C. Harrison). 
304. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2054 (2018) (“And anyway, the Commission often accords 
similar deference to its [administrative law judges], even if not by regulation”); id. (“[A] 
judge who will, in the end, issue an opinion complete with factual findings, legal conclusions, 
and sanctions has substantial informal power to ensure the parties stay in line.” (emphasis 
added)). 
305. Officers of the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 77 
(2007); West, supra note 33, at 57-58 (proposing this test based on administrative law doc-
trine). 
306. See Czars Hearing, supra note 291, at 12 (statement of Professor John C. Harrison). 
307. Cf. Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE 
L.J. 1672, 1679 (2012) (“From at least the middle of the fourteenth century, however, due pro-
cess consistently referred to the guarantee of legal judgment in a case by an authorized court 
in accordance with settled law.”); Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. 
L. REV. 1885, 1914 n.146 (2014) (collecting sources that support the claim that governmental 
deprivations of rights must be authorized by substantive law). 
308. Cf. West, supra note 33, at 51 (“The Appointments Clause, similarly, ought to capture any 
person whose activity, if it causes a cognizable harm, can be legally attributable to the U.S. 
government. Those vested with the capacity to alter legal rights on behalf of the U.S. govern-
ment wield the state’s power.”). 
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2. “Ongoing Statutory Duty” Test 
In Lucia, Justices Thomas and Gorsuch adopted the definition of “Officers of 
the United States” that Jennifer Mascott advanced in a recent Stanford Law Re-
view article: that “all federal officials with ongoing statutory duties [must] be 
appointed in compliance with the Appointments Clause.”
309
 Stated in Mascott’s 
words, an officer is anyone “whom the government entrusts with ongoing re-
sponsibility to perform a statutory duty of any level of importance.”
310
 Mascott’s 
persuasive Article undertakes an impressive review of the historical record that 
this Note cannot rival, but Mascott’s test does raise a few puzzles worth address-




First, this broader definition would treat statutorily created officials differ-
ently from similarly situated officials whose positions weren’t directly created by 
statute. Suppose, for instance, that Congress passed a statute that allowed em-
ployees within the EPA “to appoint a chauffeur, who shall drive employees to 
related work events, and during each drive, this chauffer shall provide these em-
ployees with bottled water, snacks, and pleasant conversation.” If so, this statute 
would violate the Appointments Clause. By contrast, if the EPA officials called 
cabs, or if the EPA contracted with a chauffeur company, those drivers would not 
suddenly become officers.
312
 But distinguishing these two categories as a matter 
of constitutional law makes little sense. 
Second, the broader definition does not easily explain what makes someone 
an officer of the United States. If the relevant distinction between them is that 
“[o]fficers engage[] in tasks assigned to the executive branch by law,” but em-
ployees engage in “tasks that no statute require[s],”
313
 then it becomes difficult 
to explain why lots of other duties that Congress imposes on people don’t make 
 
309. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2057 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Mascott, supra note 33, at 507-45). 
Justice Thomas also cited Mascott’s article in an earlier case, see NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 
S. Ct. 929, 946 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
310. Mascott, supra note 33, at 454. 
311. See supra notes 287-288. Notably, Mascott’s definition would rightly exclude informal presi-
dential advisers. 
312. See Mascott, supra note 33, at 508 (“For example, clerks maintaining statutorily required rec-
ords were selected in conformity with Article II even though statutes assigned the recordkeep-
ing requirements generally to an executive department or to a higher-level officer. In contrast, 
positions such as office-keeper and messenger apparently were not Article II offices. Such po-
sitions appeared on federal civil payroll lists or in other early documentary records, but no 
federal statute specifically required completion of the tasks in which these officials engaged.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
313. Id. at 514. 
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 but these entities are clearly not officers of the United 
States. For that reason, relying on the mere presence of a statutory duty to dis-
tinguish officers does not answer the real question: what duties count as those 
of the United States? By contrast, the emphasis on “sovereign authority” resolves 
this problem. 
Third, the broader definition cannot easily draw the line when officers dele-
gate authority to others—an issue that the next Section will address in more de-
tail. In short, statutes often give an officer the authority to delegate responsibil-
ities to lower-ranking officers or employees.
316
 These delegated responsibilities, 
it seems, should probably still count as statutory responsibilities that can trigger 
officer status.
317
 But if any statutory duty triggers officer status, and if delegated 
duties count as statutory duties, then it would seem to transform any person 
who could possibly be delegated “significant authority” into an officer.
318
 Per-
haps one way to draw the line would be to focus only on subdelegations that 
occur by regulation, rather than those created through a contractual relationship. 
But this formalism would allow officers to circumvent the Appointments Clause 




314. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 5000A (2018) (requiring applicable individuals to maintain minimum es-
sential health coverage); id. § 6012 (requiring people to file tax returns). 
315. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2018) (requiring states to submit state implementation plans under 
the Clean Air Act). 
316. See generally Jennifer Nou, Subdelegating Powers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (2017) (discussing 
this phenomenon). 
317. See, e.g., Brief of Professor Jennifer L. Mascott as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 
2, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (No. 17-130), 2018 WL 1156628, at *2 (“SEC ALJs carry 
out tasks that Congress has assigned to the SEC. Therefore, the SEC’s ALJs are ‘officers’ under 
the ‘statutory duty’ test.” (citations omitted)). 
318. This problem could also possibly be resolved by using constitutional avoidance. In other 
words, statutes could be construed to disallow delegation of “significant authority” to parties 
that look more like employees. Cf. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2058-59 (Breyer, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
319. See Officers of the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 
117-18 (2007) (“Congress could not evade the Appointments Clause by, for example, the arti-
fice of authorizing a contract for the supervision of the Justice Department, on the ground 
that no ‘office’ of Attorney General would be created by law—even where the statutory au-
thorization for the contract were to delegate sovereign authority and establish the continuance 
of the contractual position.”). 
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3. Subdelegating to Contingent Offices 
Delegation raises unique issues for any theory of the employee/officer dis-
tinction that looks to statutory duties. In particular, it raises the problem of con-
tingent offices. Consider the organic statute for the SEC ALJs at issue in Lucia v. 
SEC. The statute allows the SEC to “delegate, by published order or rule, any of 
its functions to . . . an administrative law judge, or an employee or employee 
board . . . .”
320
 The SEC must “retain a discretionary right to review” these del-
egated actions, but the statute does state that, if not reviewed, the action 
“shall . . . be deemed the action of the Commission.”
321
 Some of these delegable 
functions would certainly trigger officer status (e.g., the authority to promulgate 
rules defining the scope of insider trading liability).
322
 Put simply, Congress can 
draft statutes that vest statutory responsibilities—including responsibilities that 
trigger officer status—only on certain conditions.
323
 How should the Appoint-
ments Clause cope with these contingent offices? 
Consider three possibilities: First, an officer might be anyone who has the 
potential to exercise significant authority. Because the Constitution requires that 
every office be “established by Law”—the argument might go—courts should 
look only to the statute. Nothing else counts as “law,” so nothing else should be 
relevant to the decision of whether or not someone counts as an “officer of the 
United States.” Moreover, relying on agency regulations would allow those agen-
cies to determine for themselves whether or not their officials should be treated 
as officers. But this reading of the Appointments Clause would be overbroad. 
With respect to the SEC, for example, § 78d-1(a) allows the SEC to delegate “any 
of its functions” to any “employee.”
324
 Under this approach, every single em-
ployee within the SEC would be an officer, since any employee could be dele-
gated the SEC’s functions. Therefore, the Clause should require something more 
concrete than the mere possibility of “significant authority.” 
 
320. 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(a) (2018). 
321. Id. § 78d-1(b), (c). 
322. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 650-53 (1997) (describing this authority and quot-
ing 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)). 
323. Chief Justice Marshall seemed to find these sorts of delegations unobjectionable. See United 
States v. Maurice, 26 F. Cas. 1211, 1214 (C.C.D. Va. 1823) (No. 15,747) (“The army regulations 
are referred to in acts of congress, passed previous and subsequent to the execution of the 
bond under consideration. A copy of those regulations . . . has been laid before the court, and 
referred to by both parties. These regulations provide for the appointment, and define the 
duties of the agents of fortifications.”). 
324. 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(a). 
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Second, the Appointments Clause might be triggered only when an official 
actually performs the function that renders him or her an officer. (Notably, this 
theory only makes sense if one accepts that some statutory duties are too insig-
nificant to make one an officer.) Under this theory, the Clause only protects 
against particularized violations of the Clause. For instance, even if an ALJ has 
the authority to issue final decisions at other times, the Appointments Clause has 
not been violated unless and until that ALJ actually issues a final decision. But 
the Court in Freytag rejected this reading: 
Special trial judges are not inferior officers for purposes of some of their 
duties under § 7443A, but mere employees with respect to other respon-
sibilities. The fact that an inferior officer on occasion performs duties that 
may be performed by an employee not subject to the Appointments 
Clause does not transform his status under the Constitution.
325
 
Because the Clause governs who can hold an office, the violation occurs when 
the official “by Law” has the powers of an officer but has not been appropriately 
appointed. This approach thus reads the Clause too narrowly. 
Neither of these two extremes suits the Appointments Clause. Judges should 
neither speculate about the powers and duties that the official could exercise un-
der the statute, nor should they confine themselves to the actual exercise of au-
thority being challenged. Instead, the touchstone of this analysis should be the 
legal effect of the statute that Congress created. Congress must “establish [of-
fices] by Law,” so the office itself is a creature of statute. But well-accepted prin-
ciples of administrative law allow Congress to make the legal effect of a statute 
turn on subsequent executive-branch action. For example, Congress may write 
a statute so that an action by the President alters the legal regime,
326
 and so too 
Congress may “delegate” to administrative agencies rulemaking authority that 
alters the substantive effect of the law.
327
 In the same way, Congress may vest the 
President or an administrative agency with the authority to alter the nature and 
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In Lucia, that’s exactly what § 78d-1 does: it allows the SEC, “by published 
order or rule,” to alter the legal effect of the statute that “establish[es] by Law” 
the position of SEC ALJ. Generally, the Court in Lucia rightly relied on the 
agency’s regulations in assessing the authority of the office. Justice Kagan refer-
enced the regulations—not the statute itself—that gave the ALJs authority to re-
ceive evidence, examine witnesses, rule on the admissibility of evidence, and 
more.
329
 The Court, however, also seemed to rely somewhat on the ALJ’s infor-
mal authority. It noted, for instance, that the SEC accords “deference to its ALJs, 
even if not by regulation.”
330
 But such considerations should not influence the 
Appointments Clause analysis. If the SEC has given deference to its ALJs with-
out basis in law, then the appropriate legal challenge is a traditional arbitrary-
and-capricious claim. Officers cannot change the nature of the office simply by 
acting inconsistently with it, since the office is a creature of the statutory scheme. 
Though subdelegations raise thorny questions for Appointments Clause chal-
lenges, they also highlight that the appropriate object of inquiry is only the stat-
utory scheme that purports to create the office. 
conclusion 
This Note has argued that the Appointments Clause and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause together give Congress the exclusive domestic office-creation au-
thority under the Constitution. Put differently, every domestic “Office[] of the 
United States” must trace its existence to some congressional statute that “estab-
lish[es it] by Law.” This argument follows from the texts of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause and the Appointments Clause. It also respects Congress’s primacy 
over the structure of the government, and suits the Constitution’s origins in an 
act of popular sovereignty. Finally, history confirms this interpretation. The 
Founders’ institutional design rejects the unscrupulous patronage that plagued 
the British Constitution, but avoids the failures of the Articles of Confederation. 
I then apply this principle of constitutional design to a series of doctrinal puzzles. 
Together, these three doctrinal questions illustrate how Congress’s exclusive 
power over office creation should inform constitutional analysis of modern sep-
aration-of-powers cases. 
This Note also highlights the interbranch implications of the Appointments 
Clause. In an era of presidential administration, we often focus on the President’s 
role in controlling the flesh-and-blood officers that together perform the task of 
governance. But this Note’s argument shows that the Constitution’s more fun-
damental commitment is to congressional control of those offices and institutions 
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without which the government’s agents would be impotent. When evaluating 
novel separation-of-powers issues, then, we should remain cognizant of Con-
gress’s qualified supremacy. Sometimes, the President should yield to Congress’s 
authority to create and design the very institutions that make such administra-
tion possible. 
